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 For the past decade, a new form of paternalism has been emerging on the policy 
stage. Unlike ‘traditional paternalism’, which sought to make people conform to 
religious or moralistic notions of goodness, this form of ‘new-paternalism’ seeks to 
make people better off by their own judgement. For the better part of fifty years, 
behavioural sciences have been challenging assumptions of human behaviour and 
rationality. As such, the neo-paternalists seem to use behavioural economics and 
psychology’s insights to justify and legitimize their paternalistic interventions.  
 Behavioural Law and Economics are now involved in the process of 
policymaking, contributing to the relatively new field of Behavioural Public Policy. 
Libertarian Paternalism has become one of the most famous forms of this so called 
‘new-paternalism’. Its advocates claim their proposal of soft paternalism is libertarian, 
in the sense that it does not restrict freedom of choice and action, it does not coerce nor 
force, but rather it “nudges” citizens on their subjectively preferred path. The purpose 
of this dissertation is to analyse these claims by assessing the ‘new’ paternalistic 
assumptions, by studying some of their proposed initiatives and the possible 
implications that those might have on political liberty and decisional autonomy 
focussing on some liberal ideas from John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin. 
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 Recently, policymaking within different democratic governments has been 
influenced by the rise of new forms of paternalism. Unlike traditional paternalism, 
which looked to make people conform to religious or moralistic notions of goodness, 
this new-paternalism seeks to make people better off by “their own judgements”. 
Behavioural sciences have been challenging assumptions of rationality by trying to 
better understand and analyse human behaviour and decision-making. Its research and 
evidence have led to the proposal of these new emerging paternalistic interventions1. 
  Findings from behavioural psychology and the emerging field of behavioural 
economics seem to justify, for some, the institution of soft forms of paternalism. 
Libertarian Paternalism has become the most famous of these proposals, gathering more 
and more support within different parts of the world. Their proposal is said to be 
libertarian in the sense that it does not restrict freedom of choice and action, it does not 
coerce nor force, but rather “nudges” citizens on their “subjectively” preferred path. 
 At first glance, one might see the term Libertarian Paternalism as sounding like 
an oxymoron, but its advocates do not perceive it as such2. Instead they contend that it 
is possible to be paternalistic without being coercive and without restricting freedom of 
choice. It is my purpose to challenge this claim. It is because they use such a narrow 
meaning of negative liberty – the mere preservation of choice and not the capacity to 
make a decision3 - that Libertarian Paternalism can become an oxymoron4. 
                                                 
1 Mitchell, G. (2005). Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron. FSU College of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 136; see also Ginsburg, D. H.; Wright, J. D. (2012). Behavioural Law and 
Economics, Its Origins, Fatal Flaws and Implications for Liberty. Northwestern University Law 
Review, Vol. 106, No. 3: 1033-1090.; Whitman, D. G. (2010). “The Rise of New Paternalism”. CATO 
Unbound: A Journal of Debate, April Issue. 
2 Sunstein, C. R.; Thaler, R. H. (2003a). Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron. The University of 
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 76, No. 4: 1159-1202. 
3 Ginsburg and Wright (2012) 
4 Oxymoron here is understood as a simple contradiction. The term is used in reference to Sunstein and 




Why the relevance of the topic? 
 In a contemporary context discussing Libertarian Paternalism is not merely a 
theoretical exercise. For almost a decade, libertarian paternalistic techniques have been 
used in the political domain. With the results from these policies in hand, more 
governments are now showing interest in the application of this proposal, resulting in 
different behavioural public policy units being consistently integrated into government 
departments, many adopting (not exclusively) policy interventions proposed by 
libertarian paternalists5.  
In 2015 the World Bank Development Report retained a large interest in 
behavioural public policy and initiated the Global Insights Team. The next year the 
European Commission released a report that analysed the application of behavioural 
public policies within various European countries6. But what are the underlying 
assumptions behind these types of policies? How do public officials look at citizens 
under light of the emerging behavioural evidence?  
 
 “[W]e are woefully muddled information processors who often stumble along ill-
chosen shortcuts to reach bad conclusions. In their book Nudge, Thaler and 
Sunstein jokingly compare us with Homer Simpson, a character prone to bumbling 
stupidity, in order to justify governmental paternalism that protects us from 
ourselves”7. 
 
 As we shall see, it is due to the emergent behavioural evidence that libertarian 
paternalists tend to look at individuals as two selves8: a rational-self, limited by the 
                                                 
5 Oliver, A. (2013a). From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public 
Sector Policy. Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 44 No. 4:685-700. 
6 Lourenço, J.; Ciriolo, E.; Almeida, S.; Troussard, X. (2016). Behavioural Insights Applied to Policy: 
Report 2016. Brussels: European Union. 
7 Gigerenzer, G. (2016) Taking Heuristics Seriously in A. Samson (Ed.) Behavioural Economics Guide 
2016. 
8 Rebonato, R. (2012). Taking Liberties: A Critical Examination of Libertarian Paternalism. 




cognitive biases of an unreflective self.  The new-paternalists’ “implicit model of a 
human decision maker is that of an inner rational agent interacting with the world 
through an error-prone psychological shell”9. For the libertarian paternalists our 
rational-selves detain our “true” preferences and, in turn, these preferences are being 
constrained because our less then rational-self acts according to automatic, non-





 Libertarian paternalists assert that they have found a way of combining liberal 
theory with paternalistic theory, they offer Libertarian Paternalism as “a real Third 
Way”10, the middle ground between extreme opposites. These ideas have originally 
been developed by law professor Cass R. Sunstein and the economist Richard Thaler.  
 In Why Nudge: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (2014), Sunstein 
explains and defends his thesis to the libertarian by creating a kind of “dialogue” 
between his position stance and that of John Stuart Mill11. He explains that, for Mill, 
individuals should be left alone to do as they wish unless their actions cause harm to 
others, and that people are in a much better position to act in self-interest than any 
outsider. It follows, that public officials lack information to overrule freedom of choice 
on grounds of promoting one’s own well-being.  
There are other arguments in favour of Mill’s liberty, however, for Sunstein, this 
is the most important one, for he claims this principle as empirically false. In Sunstein’s 
                                                 
9 Sugden, R. (2017). Do people really want to be nudged towards healthy lifestyles? International 
Review of Economics, Vol.64, No. 2:113-123. p. 116 
10 Sunstein, C. R.; Thaler, R. H. (2009). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness. New York: Penguin Books. p. 253 
11 Sunstein, C. R. (2014a) Why Nudge? The politics of Libertarian Paternalism. New Haven and 




view, what behavioural psychology has shown is that individuals often don’t know what 
they truly desire and what is best for themselves. The new-paternalists, with their two-
selves picture, introduce the concept of internalities – harm done to oneself (more 
precisely one’s “true” self)12 as a form to justify paternalism and to challenge what 
Sunstein calls the “Epistemic Argument of the harm principle”13. 
 Within the emerging fields of behavioural sciences different empirical evidence 
has shown that human beings, more often than not, err. Theories of bounded rationality, 
of heuristics and cognitive biases have emerged and have come to play a significant role 
in economic theory and public policy. For paternalists, these human cognitive “failures” 
are what gives legitimacy for the state to intervene in order to promote what individuals 
“truly” want – welfare14.  
To the libertarian paternalist welfare can be achieved by use of “nudges”, which 
they define as: “initiatives that maintain freedom of choice while also steering peoples’ 
decisions in the right direction (as judged by people themselves)”15. Thus, this novel 
form of paternalism describes itself by “[steering] people’s choices in directions that 
(…) will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves”16. To the paternalists, their 
proposed nudges don’t coerce nor force behaviour and as such are in essence libertarian, 
so long as a person maintains the freedom to either ignore or reverse the nudge. We 
shall learn better in chapter 2, that libertarian paternalists plan to use psychological 
insights to influence behaviour, proposing to target people’s automatic cues17 and that 
nudge policies can be more intrusive, in the form of default rules, where a choice is 
                                                 
12 Rebonato (2012) 
13 Sunstein (2014a) 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. p. 17 
16 Sunstein and Thaler (2009) p. 5; emphasis in the original.  
17 Oliver, A. Nudging, Shoving and Budging: Behavioural Economic-Informed Policy. Public 





made for the individual, or they can be unobtrusive in the sense that they simply provide 
information. 
  Understanding the concept of nudging and some assumptions of Libertarian 
Paternalism, I shall use in this dissertation Rebonato’s definition: 
 
 “Libertarian Paternalism is the set of interventions aimed at overcoming the 
unavoidable cognitive biases and decisional inadequacies of an individual by 
exploiting them in such a way as to influence her decisions (in an easy reversible 
manner) towards choices that she herself would make if she had at her disposal 
unlimited time and information, and the analytical abilities of a rational decision-
maker (more precisely, of Homo-Economicus)”18 
 
 This statement does not mean that there are no limits to Libertarian Paternalism. 
At the same time it doesn’t seem to exist a clear and concrete acceptability line in their 
literature19. According to Sunstein, paternalistic measures must submit to a cost-benefit 
analysis, in which the benefits of applying paternalistic policies must outweigh the 
costs. He goes further and implies that when considering paternalistic policies of this 
kind, public officials should account in their calculus for a perceived loss of autonomy 
by an individual20.  
 But, before we turn to analyse in detail Libertarian Paternalism, there are two 
categorical distinctions that try to explain the difference between this form of 
paternalism and other, less liberal, forms. I shall try and expose them briefly through the 
eyes of the paternalists. 
  
                                                 
18 Rebonato (2012) p. 6 
19 Ibid. 




Means Paternalism vs. Ends Paternalism; Soft Paternalism vs. Hard 
Paternalism: 
 Means Paternalism respects people’s ends and only tries to change means 
employed. Ends Paternalism, disagrees with what people define as life objectives and 
tries to change these through more restrictive policies. This distinction can be very 
problematic, because it tends to generalize means and ends for everyone, when in 
actuality different people might take means to be ends and others might take ends to be 
means. Sunstein and Thaler position themselves as the means type paternalism21, but we 
shall see that in many domains their measures can be considered more akin to an ends-
paternalism type22. 
 Hard Paternalism usually imposes itself through material or psychological costs 
on a given behaviour, it is usually achieved through fines, bans or criminal punishment, 
and it cannot be considered liberal in any kind.  Hard paternalism is thus supposed to be 
more restrictive and coercive. 
 On the other end, Soft Paternalism tries to maintain freedom of choice. It does 
not ban, forbid, nor force penalties on behaviour. Instead, it tries to change behaviour 
through different methods, like education or the proposed use of “nudges”, the latter  
which can take the form of default rules, graphic warnings, and provision of salient and 
edited information. 
 To further analyse the implications of Libertarian Paternalism, I propose to 
divide the dissertation in four different chapters. The first two, mean to contextualize 
the problem. Chapter 1 will present some of Mill’s and Berlin’s ideas on liberty: if, and 
when, there is legitimacy to infringe on liberty; what objections liberals tend to carry 
against paternalism; and, lastly, the libertarian paternalistic stance in relation to liberty. 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 




In Chapter 2, I will address some of the findings that have been responsible to change 
perceptions of human rationality. This section will try to answer the question of what 
behavioural sciences brought about to justify paternalism? Finalising this chapter, the 
theoretical thesis of Libertarian Paternalism is introduced. 
 The following two chapters, 3 and 4, will be dedicated to examining, 
respectively, the practical and theoretical implications of Libertarian Paternalism on 
previously discussed understandings of liberty. 
 Chapter 3, will display practical applications of these paternalistic policy ideas, 
first proposed by nudge theorists and later by policymakers within the British 
government. These practical examples will serve to demonstrate how Libertarian 
Paternalism is not as non-coercive as its advocates argue, for the paternalists seem 
unable to foresee the unintended consequences of their policies over people’s freedom 
to act23.  
Lastly, Chapter 4 will challenge some assumptions of Libertarian Paternalism 
and discuss different implications for liberty by analysing how some of the initiatives 
put into practice can lead Libertarian Paternalism to hinder political liberty and 
decisional autonomy.  In closing, I will briefly ponder over what Libertarian 
Paternalism really is, as much of their proposed policies go beyond the scope of 
paternalistic measures. 
  
                                                 
23 Veetil, V. P. Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron: an essay in defence of Liberty. European 





On Liberty and Decisional Autonomy 
 
 In Why Nudge: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism, Cass Sunstein presents 
what he calls the “Epistemic Argument of the Harm Principle”; he directly traces the 
latter back to John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’, presenting it as the fundamental reason to 
why people are so averse to paternalism. The Epistemic Argument for the harm 
principle, according to Sunstein, is the belief that each individual is much better 
equipped than any outsider, to act in their own self-interest and towards their own 
individual well-being. Under this Epistemic Argument there cannot be legitimacy for 
external influence on individual behaviour, especially if that behaviour does not harm 
others. 
 
 “If the goal is to ensure that people’s lives go well, Mill argues that the right 
solution is for public officials to allow people to find their own paths. Because 
individuals know their tastes and situations better than officials do, they are in the 
best position to identify their own ends and the best means of obtaining them. 
 Here, then, is an enduring argument, instrumental in character, on behalf of free 
markets and free choice in countless domains, including those in which people 
choose to run risks that may not turn out so well. Let us call this the Epistemic 
Argument for the Harm Principle”24 
 
 Even though Sunstein recognises other arguments in Mill’s defence for non-
interference, he sees the Epistemic Argument as the most relevant one, and claims that 
“(…) behavioural findings are creating problems for the Epistemic Argument, because 
they show that people make a lot of mistakes, some of which can prove extremely 
damaging”25. 
                                                 
24 Sunstein (2014a) p. 7 




 In that same work of 2014, Sunstein presents Libertarian Paternalism in relation 
to questions of autonomy and the impracticality of what he call the “maximize choices” 
position, claiming that in many aspects of life people often “choose not to choose”26. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Libertarian Paternalism position in 
relation to Mill’s ideas of liberty and Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty”. But, as 
Sunstein dedicates some of his work to justify Libertarian Paternalism in relation to 
Mill, I propose before entering the discussion of liberty’s dualism presented in Berlin, to 
analyse briefly what John Stuart Mill, one of the forefathers of modern liberalism, had 
to say on the subject. It can only be fitting, for as Sunstein admits, Mill’s influence even 
today is still conspicuously present in most debates and works on the topic. 
 
1.1 John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’ 
 
 John Stuart Mill was born in London in 1806, son to James Mill, an intellectual 
in his own right. This academic influence coupled with the tutelage from the likes of 
Jeremy Bentham, helped shape Mill’s mind and life, especially regarding his utility 
theory and his utilitarian ethical view. 
 He had, what one might consider, a strict childhood, starting to learn Latin and 
Greek at the mere age of three, violently overdeveloping his mind27 at an early age. In 
his twenties he suffered a nervous breakdown, somewhat blamed on his emotion-
controlling education, making him revisit all his beliefs and becoming less radical than 
he had been in his earlier thought. 
 Later, in 1859, he published On Liberty, which would become one of the most 
influential references to the liberal debate. This essay provided a view of human 
                                                 
26 Ibid. see also Sunstein and Thaler (2009) 
27 Berlin, I. (2002c). John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life (1959) in H. Hardy (Ed.) Liberty: 




existence at both a social and political level, especially regarding individual liberty28. It 
differentiated between self-regarding actions and actions that affect other people. Its 
main objective, as stated by the author in his introductory remarks, was to assert a 
“simple” principle that should guide all dealings of society – the legitimacy that anyone 
had to interfere or restrict individual liberty – the harm principle: 
 
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm from others (…) His 
own good, either physical or moral is not sufficient warrant. (…) Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”29 
  
  For Mill, people should be absolutely free to question, speak, and act regarded 
that none of these actions hurt others. This approach directly benefits the well-being of 
each individual and consequently that of society. Liberty is then, a means to achieve 
happiness. However, Mill does not take the harm principle to be absolute. The 
possibility of harm to others does justify limitations on freedom, yet it does not mean 
that, even then, those limitations are always justified.30    
 Always asserting himself as a utilitarian, Mill believed that happiness was the 
ultimate goal for every individual, happiness which could only be attained through 
liberty under the base thought that the individual is “the primary locus of moral 
value”31. Quoting Wilhelm von Humboldt, whom he admired, he emphasized his belief 
and naturalistic view of humans: 
  
 
                                                 
28 Marlin, R. (2013) Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion (2nd Ed). Peterborough: Broadview Press 
29 Mill, J. S. (1863). On Liberty. Boston: Tickner and Fields. p. 23 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wertheimer, A. (2002) Liberty, Coercion and the Limits of the State in R. L Simon (Ed.) The 




“The end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates 
of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and 
most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent 
whole.” 32 
  
 For him, happiness would only be complete when the self, through freedom, 
reached the full potential of realization – his ultimate goal. This is why individuality is 
one of the elements of well-being, highly important to the self-realization process, but 
also to the development of society. Individuality in Mill can only be reached in freedom 
and through diversity of experiences. 
  
“It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but 
by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and 
interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of 
contemplation. (…) In proportion to the development of his individuality, each 
person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more 
valuable to others”33. 
 
 The “eccentric” man does not conform himself to customs merely because he 
does not want to, but because he does not believe that what custom dictates is the right 
way for himself. He should be free, internally and externally, to choose and act in a way 
he understands to be right. But Mill goes further and claims that the unreasonable man, 
by acting differently to custom awakes in others the possibility to do so. Everyone is 
different from one another and unquestionable conformity only cripples society. 
 A person who adheres to custom just because it is customary, not even 
questioning themselves as to why they do it, is not in fact making any kind of choice, 
but only becoming mere imitators, automatons doing as they are told or programmed to 
                                                 
32 Von Humboldt, W. The Sphere and Duties of Government. quoted in Mill (1863) p. 110 




do34. The real danger of modern times to the author is that, with the advent of 
industrialization and the masses, such conformity can stifle a man and contribute to a 
collective mediocrity. According to Berlin, Mill was acutely conscious of the: 
 
“dehumanising effect of mass culture; of the destruction of genuine purposes, both 
individual and communal, by the treatment of men as irrational creatures to be 
deluded and manipulated by the media of mass advertising and mass 
communication – and so 'alienated' from the basic purposes of human beings by 
being left exposed to the play of the forces of nature interacting with human 
ignorance, vice, stupidity, tradition, and above all self-deception and institutional 
blindness”35 
 
 A man who acts and chooses with reference to his own internal motives and 
reasons, regardless if it is to abide to custom or against it, grows as a whole. This 
argument for individuality goes in the direction of decisional autonomy36 where choices 
(actions) are made intelligently and motives are easily understood by the actor: human 
beings are those who make the important choices in their own lives.  Mill accepts that 
people have natural forces external to them and sees those as part of people’s decisional 
autonomy. He does not mean autonomy in an absolute sense, but in the sense of 
direction towards self-realization and dignity37. With this reasoning we can consider 
Mill to “operate[s] with a “positive” notion of moral freedom as well as a “negative” 
notion of civil liberty”38. 
 However, the apparently overly-simplistic harm principle raises some 
difficulties that even ardent supporters of Mill find somewhat difficult to defend, 
                                                 
34 Ibid.  
35 Berlin (2002c) p. 245 
36 Donner, W. (2010). Autonomy, Tradition and the enforcement of Morality in C. L. Ten (Ed.) Mill’s 
on Liberty: A Critical Guide.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; see also Ginsburg and Wright 
(2012) 
37 Rebonato (2012) 
38 Skorupski, J. (1998). Introduction: The Fortunes of Liberal Naturalism in J. Skorupski (Ed.) The 




especially when considering what harm might actually entail.  Do we intend to state that 
only genuine physical harm falls under this category? Or at the same time, can we 
define “offence” as harm?39 Under this light, critics claim that everything one does has 
the potential to be harmful to others as we live in society and not isolated40. Because 
Mill does not linger in working definitions for what might, or might not, mean harm to 
others, the principle is left wide open to interpretation. Notwithstanding, throughout his 
essay he introduces arguments that might help us draw a better picture of what he 
actually meant.  
 Harm is when someone’s actions cease to be self-regarding and injure other 
people’s interests, understood here as rights. So where is the definitional difficulty? Mill 
admits that a person is not an isolated being, and therefore some actions, even when 
done without intention of harm to others, may still injure someone’s rights.    
 
“Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either 
to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and 
placed in that of morality or law”41.   
 
 This becomes especially difficult regarding moral obligations towards others, 
which the author also considers.  For Mill there are moral obligations, individuals 
should be accountable to themselves and act accordingly, not acting merely on a whim 
                                                 
39 In Wertheimer (2002), we are briefly introduced to Joel Feinberg’s Treatises on the Moral Limits of 
the Criminal Law. According to Wertheimer, Feinberg presents three principles besides the harm 
principle that can be used to justify limitations on liberty; one of which is the offence principle – the 
state is justified in limiting someone’s liberty to prevent them from offending others – I do not 
believe Mill takes offence to be harm, especially because to him an opinion is of much higher value 
to the individual who holds it, than the feeling of offence against that same opinion (Mill, 1863). 
Feinberg’s two other principles are legal paternalism and legal moralism. In his essay Wertheimer 
actually goes further and presents other three principles. 
40 Berlin, I. (2002b). Two Concepts of Liberty in H. Hardy (Ed.) Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on 
Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press 




of self-interest42 (this thought goes hand in hand with his high regard for human beings 
as moral and rational). An individual can only self-develop within freedom, determined 
by one’s own morality and reason. Only then can he achieve true happiness, the 
ultimate goal. 
 Mill admits that individuals are fallible, he understands that they can act 
according to lower impulses which, in turn, can guide towards self-harm, but he also 
believes that everyone is capable of experiencing “higher pleasures” and, as such, 
revealed preferences do not necessarily align with people’s own well-being43. Thus, he 
understands that people can make judgements over other people’s decisions. However, 
contrary to paternalists, Mill does not conceive that there is justification for interference 
in individual life in reference to those personal judgements.  
 
“Mill’s case for the right to self-determination revolves around the right of 
competent adults to assess the meaning and value of their experiences for 
themselves (…) any attempt to enforce from outside a particular conception of 
the good life undermines these essential liberal interests”44 
 
 Accounting for these different characteristics of liberty in Mill, we shall now see 
the three main reasons why the author finds it essential for the state to be left out of the 
private scope of each person’s life. 
 First, Mill believed that individuals are better suited to act in their own self-
interest than any external party, for individuals tend to act in a self-regarding manner, 
towards their own happiness. Secondly, and in response to the first reason, Mill argues 
                                                 
42 In Mill (1863), Chapter V. He addresses the case in which people have moral obligations towards 
others, especially in cases of contracts, where expectations and calculations have been made. These 
contracts can and should be free to be overruled, but the individual is also bounded by moral 
obligations, especially if in ceasing the contract it directly affects injuriously third parties. 
43 Sugden, R. (2006). What we Desire, What We Have Reason to Desire: Mill and Sen on the Value of 
Opportunity, Utilitas Vol.  18, No. 1  




that even when people are not the most able to do some task, whatever that task may be, 
the state should still allow them freedom to do it, given it does not constitute harm to 
society. This will allow individuals to develop and learn on their own, and therefore 
extend their capacities to become self-determined and reach their ultimate goal. 
 The third reason, but nonetheless relevant, is that interfering in areas that should 
not fall under the state’s domain only contributes to increasing the state’s size. By 
becoming bigger, there’s not only an increase to the responsibility of state affairs, but at 
the same time the risk of making individuals much more dependent on the state, 
cramping their space for development and leading to a uniform society.  
 It is hard to pin down the full extent of Mill’s stance on liberty, especially 
considering that his views seem to be somewhat paradoxical within his own thoughts. 
He presents a principle that should guide all dealings of society but finds it hard to make 
his views absolute, leaving space for endless interpretations on legitimacy; he claims 
himself as utilitarian but asserts that utility can only be reached through individual 
freedom; he is a pluralist, admiring diversity in people, fearful of the role of custom in 
their individuality45. These are just some of the many difficulties present when 
interpreting Mill, yet we should not let these deter us or lead us to a dismissal of his 
work. As a fundamental element in liberal theories, Mill’s work is indispensable. 
 
“He broke with the pseudo-scientifc model, inherited from the classical world and 
the age of reason, of a determined human nature, (...) with the same unaltering 
needs, emotions, motives, responding differently only to differences of situation 
and stimulus, or evolving according to some unaltering pattern. For this he 
substituted (not altogether consciously) the image of man as creative, incapable of 
self-completion, and therefore never wholly predictable: fallible; (...) a free, 
imperfect being, capable of determining his own destiny in circumstances 
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favourable to the development of his reason and his gifts. (...) He believed that it is 
neither rational thought, nor domination over nature, but freedom to choose and to 
experiment that distinguishes men from the rest of nature”46 
 
1.2 Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ 
 
 In the introduction to his essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ Isaiah Berlin 
presented us, in 1958, with a dualistic idea of liberty, where he worries about the power 
of philosophical ideas and the influence they might have within the political scope. Here 
he is recognising that ideas when turned into ideologies can have the power to destroy 
societies.  
 He contends that, considering the value of liberty, two coexisting and opposing 
ideas have conflicted with one another for the past centuries, influencing different 
movements within society.  Both these concepts regard liberty from different departing 
points and answer different questions. One form is unforgivingly rationalistic47, looking 
at action restrained from within. The other form looks at men as free to develop within 
their own rights, where the state should only intervene in those areas of society where 
non-interference would result in chaos. 
 
 Negative Liberty  
 This concept regards liberty from a negative standpoint and it relates to the 
modern liberty of Constant and Mill meaning freedom from outside intervention. 
 
“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within 
which a a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from 
doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is 
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contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being 
coerced (...)”48 
 
 Berlin does not dismiss the existence of internal constraints to our actions, but 
he only considers coercion to exist when there is a deliberate outside intervention that 
restrains action. The difference lies in the cause of our incapacity to act; internal 
constraints, originating in our own limitations, do not imply less political freedom just 
less capacity to act. But if those constraints come from others, if it is an external 
interference that “frustrates my wishes”, then I am coerced and therefore less free to 
act49. 
 Within this negative concept, freedom is not understood as an absolute value but 
rather as a fundamental part of political life. Other important values must coexist with 
liberty, but there ought not be a “confusion of values”. Favouring justice or security to 
the detriment of liberty does not make life freer but rather more just or more secure.  
Coercion, even if benevolent, even if justified in the name of freedom, is not 
freedom.  And as individuals live in society and do not conduct life isolated from one 
another, the state must impose some limits in order to avoid total social chaos50. The 
government’s role becomes to protect individual rights, through laws, and to keep safe 
the: 
“area of personal freedom that which must on no account be violated; for if it is 
overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that 
minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to 
pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or 
sacred.”51    
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 As such, negative liberty is freedom from private or institutional coercion, to 
protect and ward off interference, even if benevolent, as it only restricts freedom for the 
development of individuals, consequently disrespecting their individual modes of life. 
This form of liberty does not reply to the question of “who governs me?”. 
 For Charles Taylor, it is the fear of state control that enables a limited, and 
untenable, negative concept of liberty which is separated from the truths of modern 
psychology52. For Taylor, those who support a negative concept of liberty succumb too 
easily to the attractive, yet unrealistic notion, that freedom can mean the mere lack of 
interference in one’s actions. They deny the inner-self as relevant to men’s liberty. 
According to Taylor, negative liberty becomes too quantitative and he argues that this 
cannot be so. Individuals are as much bounded by external obstacles as by inner 
restrictions (feelings, thoughts, etc), these that present obstacles to act according to 
one’s own purpose. To Taylor, liberty cannot be conveyed whilst ignoring these inner 
restrictions, regardless if those are brute or import-attributing feelings. 
 As such, Taylor argues that the concept of negative freedom needs to be 
restructured. Freedom is no longer being capable to act without obstacles, but to act 
authentic in regard to one’s true-self, a person must respond to “judgements of 
significance”53 and understand what is his/hers true purpose.  
  
“freedom now involves my being able to recognize adequately my more important 
purposes, and my being able to overcome or at least neutralize my motivational 
fetters, as well as my being free of external obstacles”54 
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 However, Berlin doesn’t conceive a quantitative version of negative liberty55, as 
Taylor argues. Berlin rather understands that there might be “many incommensurable 
kinds and degrees of freedom, and that they cannot be drawn up on in a single scale of 
magnitude”56. Furthermore, he recognises individuals as dynamic beings and agrees 
with Taylor when he states that people are dependent of inner judgements and values 
which are framed by their social context57.  
 As liberty here is considered a fundamental, but not exclusive, political right, 
government measures that impose on individual freedom (that should only be done in 
order to protect people’s rights) will lead to a relationship of constant 
tension/monitorization between private life and government authority.   
  
 Positive Freedom 
 In opposition to the negative concept of freedom Berlin presents the idea of 
positive liberty, which responds to a concept of inner autonomy. Here, my decisions are 
my own in relation to my rational self: 
 
“I wish above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to my 
own ideas and purposes.”58 
 
 Berlin understands that the two concepts might initially be perceived as very 
similar, but as they developed historically they became opposing conflicting notions of 
liberty, leading to very different movements. This divergence results in part to the fact 
that a positive concept of liberty focusses on intrinsic restrictions to freedom, presenting 
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an idea of two-selves within an individual. A higher-self, which acts according to 
reason, is constrained by a lower-self, and as such freedom responds only to rational 
action. “Freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid, or wrong. To force 
empirical selves into the right pattern is no tyranny, but liberation.”59 
 Under this concept, one can argue that even when there is no external coercion 
over our actions (providing us with an incredible amount of negative liberty), one might 
still be restrained by inner obstacles, making us incapable of taking full advantage of 
our negative liberty. As such, Berlin regards positive liberty in terms of answering the 
question of “Who is master?”. Individuals want to be in control of their lives, they want 
to overcome their intrinsic restraints. Thus, one might talk of increasing liberty, in the 
positive sense, by overcoming less rational desires.  
 As such, under this light of positive liberty, to be free is to comply with self-
control and self-determination. To act freely is to act according to one’s own reason. 
The belief in a universal truth, in the compatibility between all true answers in relation 
to reason, is for Berlin at the base thought of a positive notion of liberty60.   
 We should note that Berlin is not dismissing here the fact that those who defend 
a negative concept of liberty cannot be as pervasive as those who defend a positive 
notion of freedom. He is rather asserting that in modern times it is much more common 
and observable to use positive liberty as justification for coercive interventions in the 
name of freedom, i.e. to comply with individuals’ “true” liberties. 
 
“Legal liberties are compatible with extremes of exploitation, brutality and 
injustice. The case for intervention, by the State or other effective agencies, to 
secure conditions for both positive, and at least a minimum degree of negative, 
liberty for individuals, is overwhelmingly strong. Liberals like Tocqueville and J. 
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S. Mill, and even Benjamin Constant (who prized negative liberty beyond any 
modern writer), were not unaware of this. The case for social legislation or 
planning, for the Welfare State and socialism, can be constructed with as much 
validity from consideration of the claims of negative liberty as from those of its 
positive brother (…). Each concept seems liable to perversion into the very vice 
which it was created to resist. But whereas liberal ultra-individualism could 
scarcely be said to be a rising force at present, the rhetoric of 'positive' liberty, at 
least in its distored form, is in far greater evidence, and continues to play its 
historic role (in both capitalist and anti-capitalist societies) as a cloak for despotism 
in the name of a wider freedom.”61 
 
1.3 Liberty for the Libertarian Paternalists 
 
 With these liberal ideas in mind, Libertarian Paternalism finds space to define 
itself, it does not worry too much with a question of legitimacy but, like all types of 
paternalism, centres itself on a question of welfare and on the maximization of 
individuals well-being.  
 
“Many of the concerns about paternalistic government focus on the idea of 
‘legitimacy’, but in this context, at least, it is possible that the idea is a placeholder, 
or question begging, or perhaps even a mystification rather than a freestanding 
concept. (…) The real question is whether the action at issue makes peoples better 
or intrudes on their autonomy. (…) The question is not a bad start, but it should not 
be taken as rhetorical. On the contrary, it is less than helpful, because the abstract 
question of legitimacy mostly confuses matters. It diverts attention from what 
really matters: people’s lives.”62 
 
 To Sunstein intervening and creating soft paternalistic policies becomes 
legitimate because their goal is to improve people’s welfare. If the objective is to 
improve everyone’s own well-being, any type of interference (so long as it maintains 
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freedom of choice and is not forcibly imposed on people) can be justified63. This is 
especially poignant, if we take into account that any interference of this kind is 
supported by empirical findings, which show patterns of behaviour. These measures are 
also only put into practice after a cost-benefit analyses over the net benefit of society64. 
  In short, this type of paternalism becomes justified by the mere fact that it 
improves people’s welfare. In the same token, it becomes libertarian because it is not 
forced, allowing for alternative choice of action, and because it intends to lead us 
towards what the paternalists call our “true” preferences. Thus, Libertarian Paternalism 
does not worry itself with decisional autonomy or individualism, concepts which Mill 
believed necessary for the development of a good society and for the development of 
one’s well-being65. More relevantly we shall see that this paternalistic movement, 
against liberal views mentioned above, does not fear the possibility of increasing 
government powers and it does not find necessary to draw specific limits because it 
implicitly trusts public officials to be benevolent, and to be guided by justifiability 
principles66.  
 Regarding their views on liberty, they seem to present themselves as a middle 
ground between the positive and negative concepts. Initially, they claim their initiative 
to be libertarian on grounds that they do not restrict or coerce behaviour, thus only 
presenting what they call soft measures of paternalism67. As they assert that their 
measures don’t incapacitate alternative action, that people retain capacity of choice, 
they defend their libertarian position under a “negative” concept where freedom is the 
lack of external coercion. Further on I will show that, regarding some of their policies, 
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libertarian paternalists fail to differentiate between the mere preservation of choice and 
the actual process of decision-making. As some of their proposed policies decides for 
us, our “negative” freedom of action relies in voluntarily reversing the imposed 
intervention68. 
On the other hand, libertarian paternalists justify their initiatives in similar 
fashion to a concept of positive liberty, sharing the belief that people are constrained by 
an empirically proven “lower-self” which is fallible, and proposing interventions that 
favour people’s more rational-self. They claim to interfere in accordance to what people 
“want to want”69. It’s with this in mind that Sunstein challenges Mill’s harm principle.  
As noted in the introduction, Sunstein calls Mill’s objection to government 
interference - that people are better equipped than public officials to act in their own 
self-interest - the “Epistemic Argument of the Harm Principle” 70. According to him, 
this argument is being challenged by different findings regarding human behaviour71. 
Sunstein uses this to justify Libertarian Paternalism, as this form of paternalism 
proposes soft measures that target internalities (harms that one does to oneself) it 
doesn’t infringe on the harm principle.  
 Despite sharing this two-selves picture, they cannot be considered as acting 
within a “positive” notion of liberty because their interventions are not intended to make 
individuals freer to act on their own, i.e. in favour of their “higher-selves”. Libertarian 
paternalists do not propose to overcome individuals’ fallibilities in favour of freedom, 
but instead they propose to exploit those fallibilities in favour of welfare.  
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 “Their programme is essentially one of context manipulation, not one of 
fostering rationality”72 and because they set their goal as to achieve individual’s well-
being above everything else, they call themselves paternalistic. For Sunstein, decisional 
autonomy as an intrinsic process of development is, in itself, an apparent inner moral 
heuristic. 
 
 “Let me venture a stronger, more direct and perhaps reckless response to those 
who invoke autonomy. On one view, what really does and should matter is welfare, 
for which claims about autonomy are best understood as heuristic (at least in the 
areas under discussion here). More precisely, autonomy is what matters to System 
1, but on reflection, the real concern, vindicated by System 2, is welfare. People 
speak in terms of autonomy, but what they’re doing is making a rapid, intuitive 
judgement about welfare”73 
  
 Under this light, it seems plausible to ask a few questions: Is welfare enough of 
a legitimate reason for paternalism to hinder our freedom in certain areas of our life? 
Can our decisional autonomy really be affected by these “harmless” nudges, which 
intend to use our “irrationalities” to comply with government’s ideas of what is our own 
well-being? Most importantly, does Libertarian Paternalism actually respect liberal 
understandings? Can Libertarian Paternalism be considered truly paternalistic?  It is my 
intention to try and answer these questions by analysing various assumptions of 
Libertarian Paternalism and consequent implications for individual freedom. But first I 
propose to contextualize and present Libertarian Paternalism under theories of 
behavioural sciences and, more specifically, of behavioural economics. 
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 Behavioural Sciences and the Origins of Behavioural Public Policy 
 
2.1 The Emergence of Behavioural Sciences 
 
 Towards the end of the 19th century, psychology became the science inspired to 
study human nature. With the development of new technology and methodologies that 
promised to comprehend the inner workings of man, human behaviour and processes of 
decision-making have become more accessible to scientists. 
 Social psychology in these first instances was still very speculative, but with the 
horrors of the First World War an idea of men’s irrationality became easier to conceive, 
leading to the realization of the powerful influence that emotion and fear play in 
people’s decisions. Both unconscious and subconscious thought started being 
empirically tested leading to the belief that people’s decisions can be guided by obscure 
intentions. Realizing the role of social influence, imagery, metaphors, framing, etc. on 
people’s decisions warranted the impossibility of neutrally presenting choices. 
 With the advancement of technology; with the implementation of laboratory and 
field research; and with a more thorough methodology of study on the whole, 
psychology became one of the most important fields to understand human nature. 
Towards the second half of the 20th century many new emerging cognitive, social and 
behavioural findings would come to have great influence in different academic fields.  
 It was psychology, through scientific methods, that originally studied the impact 
of internal and external characteristics over our actions, but it wasn’t psychology alone 
that influenced the thesis of Libertarian Paternalism. The justification for paternalism in 
this instance relied mostly on evidence from a field developed much later, a field put 




 For the past four decades or so, behavioural economics has become a specialized 
field within broader economical subjects. It analyses real behaviour in situations of risk 
and uncertainty, it assesses shifts in preferences, it observes behaviour throughout time 
in order to find patterns and causes regarding human decisions. In short, it’s a scientific 
field dedicated to empirically studying decision-making processes within economics.  
 Behavioural economics is also the field that has postulated that people are 
constantly side-lined by cognitive “inefficiencies”.  Behavioural economists, departing 
from psychology, concluded that people tend to overweigh irrelevant information; that 
time is inconsistent; that we are prone to inertia and procrastination; that memory and 
saliency play tricks on us and so forth. These inconsistencies and many others have 
been empirically tested and are presumed to lead towards systematic errors in 
judgement74.  
 These findings play a big part in justifying Libertarian Paternalism, and as such 
a contextualization of what has been discussed in the realm of behavioural economics 
seems to be in order. Bearing in mind that these are over-simplifications of much 
broader subjects, I hope it will be sufficient to understand some of the ideas that have 
come to influence libertarian paternalists. 
 
2.1.1 Assumptions of Rationality in Economics 
 In the 18th century, Daniel Bernoulli devised an economic theory under 
assumptions of human rational choice. Even today, expected utility theory75 is possibly 
the most influential model of rational choice in economics. Bernoulli asserted that 
rational beings would always try to maximise their expected utility, i.e. a subjective 
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value of their own – understood by economists as happiness, well-being or 
satisfaction76. He assumed that people’s wealth was what made them more or less happy 
and as such, utility rose in a decreasing manner (declining marginal utility). Further in 
time, economics tried to devise ways of measuring cardinal utilities, i.e. people’s 
strength of preferences which reflect the value people place on a given good. Welfare 
economics would develop in a way to maximise society’s utility. 
 In the beginning of the twentieth century, with Alfred Marshall and the rise of 
neoclassical economics, more mathematical rigour was introduced to theories of utility 
maximization. By this point, an ordinal measure of value dominated welfare, indicators 
of the economical organisation of society were based on improvements and 
deteriorations77.   
 Towards the 1950’s, mathematics and logic become central to the development 
of neoclassical economics, where the “the quest increasingly focussed upon developing 
neat models of internal consistency that were divorced from the human experience”78. 
With the implementation of mathematical and logical rigour to economics, a more 
specified “neo-Bernoullian” theory of subjective expected utility rose. 
 Under descriptive predictions, expected utility theory assumes unquestionable 
rationality in the process of decision-making. Man acts as best as possible through the 
use of logic, reason, and a detailed analysis over all relevant information79. Choices are 
made in way of achieving one’s preferences, which tend to be stagnant, unchangeable, 
and consistent through time. In this manner, people act according to well-formed beliefs 
even under situations of risk and uncertainty. 
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 Individual rationality has become the main foundation of mainstream 
economics, and expected utility theory its most dominant model. However, as some 
argue, normative accounts of rational choice should not be confused with descriptive 
accounts80.  Under a normative light, expected utility theory means to show how 
humans ought to act and decide if people are indeed utility maximisers and fully 
rational. But, as these rational models yield observably inaccurate predictions, its 
logical assumptions must be put into question under a descriptive light.  
“Although people ought to adhere to the axioms of rationality if they are 
expected utility maximisers, they often do not do so”81. To surmise, when human beings 
behave rationally one can predict their behaviour, by contrast when they become 
irrational by rational model standards, they become unpredictable. 
 Not dismissing any normative value to expected utility, especially in market-
based transactions, we cannot consider it a descriptive theory, that is a theory that 
intends to show how human beings do decide82.  As such, initial developments in the 
field of economics during the 1950’s started to challenge this rational choice model by 
trying to explain what was considered irrational behaviour.  
 
2.1.2 Bounded Rationality 
 Even though some scientists in the 1950’s were challenging rational choice 
theory (a smart maximization of self-interest83) by empirically testing its formal axioms, 
others were questioning mainstream economics from other departing views. Herbert A. 
Simon, a psychologist and computer scientist, dedicated his life’s work to building a 
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theory of human behaviour. By the 50’s he broke away from the traditional mainstream 
economic stance and started to introduce his highly influential concept of bounded 
rationality, which went directly against the neoclassical theory of global rationality.84 
 For Simon the problem arose from an evident detachment of economic theory 
from reality. Until then, economic models failed in conceiving a realist and practical 
view of human beings, and in his seminal paper of 1955 - A Behavioural Model of 
Rational Choice – he refuted the neoclassical position, proposing that the theory of  the 
“economic man” needed revision. Economic models seemed to fail specifically due to 
their lack of realism85 and so he set his task to: 
 
“(…) replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational 
behaviour that is compatible with the access to information and computational 
capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of 
environment in which such organisms exist.”86 
 
 What Simon here calls environment is assumed to exist, in part, within the 
decision-maker and not just outside his biology. It is external and internal. Regarding 
decision-making we are bounded by our psychological capacities – inner constraints – 
and by the external contexts where we make our decisions – external constraints. To 
Simon these external behavioural variables will still be limited by our physiology and 
psychology.  It is from this viewpoint that he moves to theorise that individuals’ inner 
constraints don’t allow for a full rationality as understood by neoclassic economic 
standards. Lack of knowledge, of information, of access, of time, etc. makes it difficult 
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to fully optimize any type of decision, leading individuals to “satisfice”, that is, to 
compromise and decide on something that is good enough87.  
 Bounded rationality assumes that individuals have goals (preferences) and at the 
same time constraints88. It is here that a divergence takes place from mainstream 
economics and a different path is set where behavioural economics89 starts to develop as 
an alternative to neoclassical theory:  
  
“Global rationality, the rationality of neoclassical theory, assumes that the decision 
maker has a comprehensive, consistent utility function, knows all the alternatives 
that are available for choice, can compute the expected value of utility associated to 
each alternative, and chooses the alternative that maximizes expected utility. 
Bounded rationality, a rationality that is consistent with our knowledge of actual 
human choice behaviour, assumes that the decision maker must search for 
alternatives, has egregiously incomplete and inaccurate knowledge about the 
consequences of actions, and chooses actions that are expected to be satisfactory 
(attain target while satisfactory constraints)”90 
  
 Bounded rationality here stands as a negative concept in relation to global 
rationality and so, it serves to illustrate and criticize the neoclassical position. At the 
same time, it’s perhaps too broad a term, oversimplifying what’s wrong with the former 
tradition without fully proposing alternative options. Some might even argue that it’s 
this characteristic of low specificity that explains the popularity of the concept.91  
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 Regardless, the concept has given way to an alternative train of thought that 
behavioural economists have put forward, one where people are not assumed to be fully 
rational but with inherent limits to their decision-making processes. Behavioural 
economics “extends economic principles by allowing that our decisions are affected by 
social and psychological influences, as well as a rational calculation of benefits and 
costs”92. 
 Different theories of bounded rationality as alternatives to the orthodox view 
have been proposed: Ecological Rationality, Practical Rationality, Selective Rationality, 
all have been hypothesised as opposing/complementary traditional theories to the Homo 
economicus. As such, the general consensus over what bounded rationality actually is 
seems to be insufficient and possibly too diverse, nonetheless it is a fundamental part of 
contemporary economics. 
 
2.1.3 The Emergence of Behavioural Economics 
 As noted, neoclassical economic theory seems to believe that people act in their 
own interest after a cost-benefit analysis over the information and evidence they have. 
Individuals are a reflection of their preferences and mostly rational.  
Under this light, economic models have been designed to account for supply and 
demand, different market behaviours, speculation, prices, etc. Market failures seem to 
occur only due to lack of institutional support or other intrinsic factors, rarely because 
economic individuals are fallible. Behavioural economists defend that those 
assumptions depart from a mere theoretical standpoint, without proper practical or 
                                                 




realistic views. They propose, then, to look additionally at the behaviour of individual 
decision makers who constitute a market.93 
 Recent cognitive and social psychological studies have presented a large body of 
evidence challenging standard economic assumptions. We have seen in the previous 
section how Simon looked at economic rationality and challenged it from a generalized 
point of view. As the concept of bounded rationality became too broad to explain 
market failures, or problems with rational behaviour, others tried to study specific 
failures of rationality through more observable and testable evidence, borrowing from 
psychological methods. 
 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, considered to be the prominent fathers of 
behavioural economics, set out in the 1970’s to try and comprehend complexities in 
human decisions. They both had realised that their own answers to certain postulates 
inferred in systematic and predictable errors. Under this pretence they conceived 
experimental studies where they were to analyse reoccurring mistakes within 
individuals’ decision-making processes, those which are caused by heuristics (rules of 
thumb) and cognitive bias (blind spots)94.  
 Before analysing some of Kahneman’s and Tversky’s specific work, let us 
discuss briefly Dual Process Theory as it is highly relevant to interpreting some of these 
findings. 
 
2.1.4 Dual Process Theory 
  Although the distinction between a fast/intuitive way of thinking and that of a 
deliberate/reflective one is present in early psychology, it is during the 1980’s and 
1990’s that Dual Process Theory empirically tests the idea of a binary system of 
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thought. It proposes the existence of a System 1, which is automatic, almost intuitive 
and immediate. This System has throughout our lives learnt from different scenarios, 
applying rules of thumb to life's’ different situations. It is not irrational, but due to 
System 1 people are led to make mistakes, wrong considerations and choose without 
due deliberation, which in turn contributes to less than optimal results95. 
 This so-called automatic System 1 triggers impulsive and fast reactions to any 
little push in our lives, it is not about irrationality, but adaptability to everyday life – a 
matter of evolution – and when we don’t slow down and reconsider what it’s 
suggesting, especially in the case of unfamiliar situations such as risk and uncertainty, 
mistakes tend to be made.  
 As System 1 can be considered the most child-like part of our brain (and we 
shall see it as the intended target of Libertarian Paternalism96) System 2 is its adult 
counterpart. On the one hand it is reflective and effortful, responsible for slowing down 
our processing brains and allowing for a better analysis of any given problem. On the 
other hand, it’s responsible for monitoring and controlling actions and thoughts 
suggested by System 1, it’s what allows for inner self-control. System 2 is thus 
expressed by thoughtful behaviour as well as for the suppression of thoughts and actions 
it doesn’t deem proper. In some literature System 2 becomes Adam Smith’s “impartial 
spectator”97 whereas System 1 is more akin to Keyne’s “animal spirits”98.  
 
“[System 2] allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, 
including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated 
with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration”99  
                                                 
95 Sunstein and Thaler (2003a; 2003b; 2009) 
96 For Rebonato (2012) it is this idea of Dual Process Theory that allows the libertarian paternalists to 
depict individuals with two separate selves. 
97 Oliver (2017) 
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There is some interaction between these two systems, System 1 is the first to 
analyse any situation and the first to respond. It works as a monitor and calls on System 
2 only when it finds necessary, when unable to process the task at hand. Some argue 
that this is especially true because the reflective system is a limited resource and can be 
expended, a process that is called ego-depletion100. 
 Having briefly explained Dual Process Theory in our decision-making processes 
I shall turn now to Kahneman and Tversky’s original work. However it should be noted 
beforehand that it was this theory of Dual Process and the extensive research done in 
behavioural economics that went on to influence advocates of Libertarian Paternalism.  
 
2.1.5 Behavioural Economists on Heuristics and Cognitive Bias 
 When making decisions we are constantly subjected to inner heuristics and 
cognitive biases, as a result “errors of intuitive thought are often difficult to prevent”101. 
The following questions, which ask people to reply with the first answer that comes to 
mind (usually suggested by the automatic system) are part of a wide Cognitive 
Reflection Test done in hundreds of experiments. 
 
 
 A bat and a ball cost 1.10 €. The bat costs one euro more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
 
 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
 
                                                 
100 In Kahneman (2012); Ego-Depletion is a term originally proposed by Roy Baumeister whom, 
alongside his team, has implied that our mental efforts run on glucose. His research has led to the 
conclusion that glucose levels in the body are directly correlated with deterioration of thought 
performance (ego-depletion), that is, when glucose levels are high ego-depletion decreases; see also 
Garvey, J. (2016). The Persuaders: The Hidden Forces that are Trying to Change Your Mind. 
London: Icon Books.  




 In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half the lake? 
 
 
 More than half the respondents to these questions, usually done to university 
students in academic studies, answer wrongly102. Obviously, these questions have been 
purposely chosen because they tend to induce in error by targeting our more automatic 
brain cells. It is only when the reflective system comes to aid, that people rethink their 
intuitive answers and understand that a ball costs 5 cents, that it takes 5 minutes for 100 
machines to make 100 widgets, and that it takes 47 days for the patch of lily pads to 
cover half the lake.  
 In an article published in 1974 entitled Judgement under Uncertainty: heuristics 
and biases, Kahneman and Tversky argued that we assess probabilities as we do 
physical quantities, such as distance or size. We use rules that System 1103 suggests in 
order to move away from unnecessary complexities. These rules are valid for most 
cases, but in unfamiliar situations, as in cases of risk and uncertainty, they often lead to 
errors. The authors were starting to demonstrate failures that occur systematically in 
human judgement. They hypothesized that these judgements are highly influenced by 
the role of belief and they concluded that: 
 
“people rely in a number of heuristic principles which reduced the complex tasks 
of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgemental operations. 
In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to sever and 
systematic errors”104.  
                                                 
102 Ibid. see also Garvey (2016) 
103 Even though Evan, Stanovich and West developed Dual Process Theory in the 1980’s/90’s; 
Kahneman (2012) recognises and assumes this theory as complementary to his and Tversky’s work. 
104 Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1974). Judgements under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 




 Kahneman and Tversky’s research program has been responsible for finding 
many of these systematic errors, connecting them with System 1 of Dual Process 
Theory. Other behavioural scientists expanded their programme and found evidence of 
many more biases. In turn, the study and discovery of these factors of behaviour have 
deeply influenced Sunstein and Thaler in their proposal of Libertarian Paternalism, and 
as such it seems relevant to touch on some of these findings to later understand many of 
libertarian paternalists’ assumptions and how they are proposing to use insights from 
behavioural economics to put Libertarian Paternalism into practice. 
 
 A. Representativeness, Availability and Anchoring 
 In that same article mentioned above, Kahneman and Tversky identified three 
heuristics in the assessment of probabilities and statistics. The representativeness 
heuristic is the way in which people tend to adjust their judgements to stereotypical 
ideas105. Consider the two following descriptions, knowing that both have been present 
in studies over probabilities. 
 
 
 Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest n 
people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and 
structure, and a passion for detail. 
 
 Linda is a thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a  student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination 
and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.  
 
 
                                                 




 When presented with these questions people are asked: what is Steve more 
likely to be? A farmer, a salesman, a pilot, a librarian or a doctor? What about Linda, is 
she more likely to be a bank teller, an insurance salesperson, or a “bank teller and active 
in the feminist movement”?  
 Statistically speaking Steve is much more likely to be a salesman or a farmer as 
there are much more people in those professions then in any other options presented. 
Yet, respondents often answer that Steve is probably a librarian. More surprisingly, a 
majority of respondents believe that “bank teller and active in the feminist movement” 
is probably the right answer in relation to Linda, because apparently both descriptions 
are coherent with our stereotypes of a librarian and then the feminist movement. 
 Kahneman and Tversky conclude that to analyse probability people often 
consider subjective descriptions as the most representative input. According to 
Kahneman when regarding the Linda conundrum, we are primed  (respond to 
subconscious cues) by irrelevant information to commit the conjunction fallacy - to 
judge a conjunction of two events more likely than just one of those same events106.  
 In their research the authors continued to analyse different choices under 
situations of uncertainty, realising that people tend to judge frequency according to the 
examples that come most easily to our mind. They called this rule of automatic response 
the availability heuristic and assumed that different factors contribute to it.  
When asked about frequency, individuals automatically access their subjective 
memory, which is highly influenced by saliency, familiarity and time. Therefore, the 
picture we draw of the world is highly dependent on the prevalence and emotional 
intensity of messages and information that can be provided by personal experience or 
                                                 




external sources107.  Availability can be the cause that makes us overlook or 
overestimate certain dangers, the frequency of an event or even different beliefs we hold 
about reality. 
 Upon demonstrating the Anchoring Effect both these authors concluded that 
when you have a number in your mind, regardless of where it comes from, it will 
always influence and guide a possible estimate.  There are two different types of 
anchors, on one hand they are involved in a process of adjustment – you guide yourself 
by accessing information you already have. On the other hand, anchors can be of a 
priming nature108 - acting as mere suggestions, thus becoming impossible to avoid. 
 What research has shown is that no matter the source or the information you 
have, it seems to be impossible to stray very far from the initial anchor, we are easily 
guided by random and non-random numbers which challenge our assumptions about 
value, speculation, prices and about the power of influence in negotiation109. 
Consequently, we are highly dependent on the context and in how numbers are 
presented to us110. 
 
 B. Loss Aversion and Framing 
 Human beings have genuine loss aversion, i.e. the possibility of losing 
something is felt much more ardently than the possibility of winning, in comparison, 
that same particular thing. “What this means is that people do not assign specific values 
                                                 
107 Ibid.; see also Garvey (2016); Sunstein and Thaler (2008): Regarding the availability heuristics these 
authors provide the example of terrorism since 9/11/2001, which in the west has been seen like a 
constant threat. Nations spend time, effort and public resources to tackle this issue, which results in 
that people tend to overestimate the frequency of terrorism on basis of memory, recurrence and 
salience when it so happens that even in Israel people die less of terrorism than of heart-attack. 
108 Kahneman and Tversky (1974) present a study where two groups observed two rigged games of a 
roulette wheel, both groups were then asked to guess the percentage of African nations in the UN. 
Results showed that the roulette wheel experiment actually influenced responses, despite everyone 
knowing that such a random number is irrelevant in such assessment. 
109 Garvey (2016) 




to objects. When they have to give something up, they are hurt more than they are 
pleased if they acquire the very same thing”111. Loss aversion explains the endowment 
effect which observes that people place a much greater value on a particular good when 
they own it than they did before they owned it112. 
 Similarly, when it comes to framing, Kahneman and Tversky realized that 
people’s reactions and preferences are highly influenced by the way in which contexts 
and ideas are proposed to them. They tried to demonstrate how life is affected everyday 
by how information is presented, how language can have a deep impact on decisions, 
and how different words with virtually the same meaning can lead to different answers. 
“Preferences between the same objective outcomes reverse with different 
formulations”113.  
The idea of framing is not exclusive to economic realities; in media, 
advertisement and politics, frames are of the utmost importance and have a deep impact 
on public opinion114. 
  By studying the power of frames experts can realise how to propose ideas or 
policies in a better light, resulting in possible better results115. Libertarian paternalists, 
for example, call attention to this and recognise the use of framing as possibly perverse, 
in the sense that it can be used to shift general opinion in certain directions. At the same 
time these paternalists admit that frames can be used in a manner to “nudge” towards 
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individuals’ own well-being by, for example, providing framed information that targets 
our System 1116. 
 Notwithstanding, it was concepts of loss aversion and framing that allowed 
Kahneman and Tversky to directly challenge economic rational choice models. Their 
research proposed preference inconsistencies, risk-averse and risk-seeking 
characteristics within the same individual, plus a decreasing utility associated, not to 
amounts of wealth, but to strong emotional responses regarding losses. 
  
 C. Status-quo and Present Biases 
 Two highly relevant cognitive biases in the behavioural literature that directly 
influence Libertarian Paternalism in its policy application is the status quo bias and 
present bias. In reference to the first, it is implied that people generally tend to stay with 
their current situation no matter what. This means that people tend to suffer from inertia 
as they do not want to change their status quo in favour of an uncertain future. As we 
shall see further on, it is this idea of inertia that will allow libertarian paternalists to 
propose interventions that implicitly design a status quo as the “default choice”. 
 In this same regard, present bias or what others call, hyperbolic discounting 
shows that people attach a particularly heavy weight to the present time, valuing the 
immediate moment to the detriment of the future. Individuals tend to show dynamic 
inconsistency throughout time and consequently decisions in the present moment are 
not aligned with people’s more deliberative preferences, i.e. not aligned with that which 
will give them the most utility117.  
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 This idea of hyperbolic discounting allows behavioural economists to divide the 
individual into two semi-autonomous selves118 somewhat associated with Dual Process 
Theory. A present-self that responds to immediate moments imposing costs on a future-
self with different, perhaps more rational, preferences119. The idea of two-selves in time, 
present in behavioural economics, leads to the assumption that we have negative 
internalities – harms that impose on one’s future-self. It is with this in mind that 
libertarian paternalists will highlight individuals’ tendencies for lack of self-control 
(akrasia120). 
 The exposed work above seems sufficient to demonstrate some of the underlying 
assumptions of behavioural economics and which, combined with Herbert Simon’s 
bounded rationality, allow to see individuals with inner constraints that directly impact 
decisions against their own well-being121.  Dual Process Theory has also deeply 
impacted many behavioural fields, and under its wing Sunstein and Thaler distinguish 
two selves, the “adult” and the “child”, and assume that the real world is shared between 
Humans and Econs, between Homo sapiens and Homo economicus respectively. They 
argue that the majority are Humans (rationally bounded individuals that act in favour of 
their System 1 and therefore need intervention in many areas to be able to reach better 
outcomes). 
 
“Those who reject paternalism often claim that human beings do a terrific job of 
making choices, if not terrific, certainly better than anyone else would do 
(especially if that someone else works for the government) (…). If you look at 
economic textbooks, you will learn that homo economicus like Albert Einstein, 
store as much memory as IBM’s Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of Mahatma 
Gandhi. (...) Real people have trouble with long division if they don’t have a 
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calculator, sometimes forget their spouse’s birthday, and have a hangover on New 
Year’s Day. They are not homo economicus; they are homo sapiens. To keep our 
Latin usage to a minimum we will hereafter refer to these imaginary and real 
species as Econs and Humans”122 
 
  For libertarian paternalists intended purposes, System 2 (responsible for our 
rationality) is separate from System 1123 (responsible for our lack of self-control, time 
inconsistency, and other alleged errors in rational behaviour). These paternalists assume 
it as their responsibility to create policies that engage our System 1 in order to act with 
as if rationality, i.e. in order to make us behave towards our subjective well-being124.  
 
2.2 Behavioural Welfare Economics and the call for Paternalism 
 
 Paternalism has many forms and possible definitions, here it will be understood 
as libertarian paternalists define it: a policy that intends “to steer people’s choices in 
directions (…) that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves”125.  The 
metaphor of paternalism comes from a parent who interferes with the choices of a child 
in order to promote that child’s greater good, for they do not believe that their children 
know best or are acting accordingly. But as harder forms of paternalism demand and 
force people’s choices, Libertarian Paternalism is proposing to guide and “steer” 
towards good behaviour.  The emphasis on “judged by themselves” is highly relevant, 
because it shows the authors’ belief in knowing and being able to attain, objectively, 
what people’s “true” preferences are.  
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 Under this definition paternalism is driven by the intention to guide citizens126, 
who don’t act in their best interest, towards their ultimate well-being. As such, it is not 
enough to judge people’s individual choices to be paternalistic, but it is rather 
imperative to intervene in accordance to those judgements127.  
 In neoclassic economic theory, paternalism is not a very common viewpoint, 
usually associated with unnecessary regulations and bureaucracy that encroaches on 
free-markets, consumer sovereignty and self-interest. Notwithstanding, in 2003 two 
different papers128, relatively similar in content, were published by different academics 
in the fields of economic law and behavioural economics. Both proposed conceptual 
frameworks on how insights taken from behavioural sciences could and should be 
applied to policy. They justified themselves by presenting different findings from this 
new emerging behavioural field. 
 The two articles are similar in content in the sense that they both propose soft 
forms of paternalism, specifically targeting change in consumer/citizen behaviour. But 
also, because they take welfare as a normative objective and at the same time make 
modifications to modern welfare economics by seemingly detaching the achievement of 
well-being from individual choice129.  These two separate ideas have been defined as 
proposals of a “new” paternalism, and they are both adamant that behavioural findings 
call for paternalism130.  
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 “Virtually every scholar who has written on the application of psychological 
research on judgment and choice to law has concluded that cognitive psychology 
supports institutional constraint on individual choice.”131  
 
 The paternalists argue “for self-conscious efforts, by private and public 
institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve their own 
welfare.”132 Offering measures that improve behaviour on boundedly rational 
individuals, without ever forcing or coercing.  
 In Thaler and Sunstein their form of paternalism is said to be libertarian because 
it preserves freedom of choice, but as its’ main goal is to influence people’s choices in 
order to make them better off, it becomes descriptively paternalistic133. 
 In Camerer et al., they term their approach as Asymmetric Paternalism. The 
authors admit this form of paternalism as a conservative notion on their part for fear of 
promoting, “at this stage”134, harder forms of paternalism. They become cautious and 
conservative under three assumptions: (1) They recognise that, even though there’s 
evidence showing the limits of human rationality, those limits are not universal. Some 
individuals can and do act according to standard concepts of rationality. (2) They admit 
that behavioural economics is a relatively new science and therefore its findings should 
be dealt with caution and should not be treated as unquestionable. (3) They share the 
common knowledge that people value freedom of choice and they fear that some of the 
proposed policies might be understood to encroach on people’s freedom135. In this sense 
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it differentiates from Thaler and Sunstein’s work, who don’t seem to look so carefully at 
the behavioural evidence, but also because Camerer et al. admittedly assume that the 
preservation of choice and soft paternalism is not enough to claim their proposal as 
liberal as it implies costs on those who are considered rational decision-makers and 
because in some regards their policies restrict voluntary actions. 
 Despite their differences, both these works seem to share the view that the 
debate about paternalism should shift focus from a legitimacy standpoint to an empirical 
one. If empirical evidence is showing that fully-rational beings are indeed rare in society 
and that individuals do not always act according to their own self-interest, thus 
challenging the foundation for free-markets and individual liberty. Then, they claim, the 
debate between the two positions (paternalist vs. anti-paternalist) becomes 
counterproductive136. Where one is discussing emerging empirical evidence, the other is 
arguing on bases of belief.  
The new paternalists hope to reach a compromise between these two positions – 
the middle ground. Policies to be effective should contend emerging empirical evidence 
that show how human beings do act, yet those policies should not encroach on 
individual freedom of choice. 
 For their part Sunstein and Thaler assume that the problem with the anti-
paternalistic stance is that it’s based on one false assumption and two misconceptions. 
The false assumption is that people usually make choices in their own best-interest, or at 
least better choices than any external person might impose on them. The authors argue 
that this is a testable and measurable assumption and what behavioural evidence has 
shown, so far, is that it is also obviously false.137 In claiming this, the key liberal 
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assumption in Mill, the so called “Epistemic Argument of the harm principle” - 
individuals are the best judges and protectors of their own well-being – falls to 
ground.138 
 The two above mentioned misconceptions are: first, the belief that there are 
possible alternatives to paternalism and secondly that paternalism must always involve 
coercion. Against the first misconception, Sunstein and Thaler argue that there’s always 
some sort of paternalism at hand, it is inevitable: individual choices are constantly 
influenced by external intervention. This idea is somewhat of a conundrum, as the 
libertarian paternalists seem to be implying that anti-paternalists believe any influence 
over human behaviour to be paternalistic139. Under light of what we have seen before, 
where paternalism is defined by the intention to change behaviour this idea becomes 
somewhat of a moot point. 
  Regardless, in response to the second misconception – the belief that 
paternalism always involves coercion – Sunstein and Thaler argue that outside 
interference, which influences people’s decisions in favour of their well-being, can be 
done without necessarily blocking individual choice. It is under this belief that they 
name their paternalism as libertarian. 
 Having this in mind, the theory of Libertarian Paternalism seems to contend 
various suppositions: First, it refuses an idea of rationality in decision-making and 
therefore treats individuals for what they truly are: boundedly rational. In doing this, 
libertarian paternalists claim that what individuals choose on their own can be, not only 
harmful for society, but also, and mainly, harmful for themselves140.  
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 Secondly, they assume, under pretence of behavioural sciences, that preferences 
are endogenous, not stable or well-define but rather context-dependent141. This means 
that preferences can be influenced by any “frame” in the setting and as a result of our 
bounded rationality and preference endogeneity, people’s choices are not reliable to 
promote one’s best interest unless “choice architects” nudge individuals to select the 
welfare-advancing option.142 
 Thirdly, because of this context-dependency, the power of influence over 
people’s behaviour by those who control the design of contexts is unavoidable, and as 
such, a form of paternalism becomes the only viable option; because what truly matters 
is welfare143. That is, if the benefits of Libertarian Paternalism are larger than the harms 
done, if after a cost-benefit analyses it is concluded that individuals’ well-being is 
improved144, then legitimacy lies on how to produce situations that promote people’s 
welfare. “[I]t is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s behaviour in 
order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better”145 because ultimately, Sunstein 
argues, this is what individuals really want. Here he defines welfare from the 
individuals’ point of view to mean: “whatever choosers would think make their lives go 
well”146 
 
 “Once it is understood that some organizational decisions are inevitable, that a form 
of paternalism cannot be avoided, and that the alternatives to paternalism (such as 
choosing options to make people worse off) are unattractive, we can abandon the less 
interesting question of whether to be paternalistic or not, and turn to the more 
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constructive question of how to choose among the possible choice-influencing 
options”147 
 
 Lastly, the role of Libertarian Paternalism becomes to figure out, through the 
input of behavioural sciences, when and where people tend to systematically err. A 
policymaker needs to understand how a person truly behaves so steps can be taken to 
prevent harmful behaviour. To Sunstein and Thaler the form in which government 
ought to help humans is by using what they call “nudges” and by principles of “choice 
architecture”, to which I now turn.  
 
2.3 Libertarian Paternalism 
 
 Although both these articles were written around the same time and had 
fundamentally the same proposals in mind, though displaying some differences in their 
conceptual frameworks, it was only in 2008 with the publication of Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness that the thesis of an alternative “new” 
paternalism became widely known. 
  Within this book, they proposed several nudging interventions. Nudges being 
the fundamental application of Libertarian Paternalism, understood as tools of influence 
applied through private or public policies, targeting our less conscious reactions.  
It should be noted that these nudges are not new tools of influence, industries 
such as communications, sales, marketing, etc. are experts in nudges.148  The libertarian 
paternalists are merely acknowledging the power of these techniques in steering 
behaviour and are inviting governments to design policies that, without being coercive, 
try to prevent or ameliorate negative internalities – harms imposed on oneself in 
contrast to the concept of externalities. Nudges are supposed to be an interference that 
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“alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives”149 by specifically targeting our 
System 1 of Dual Process Theory discussed before. 
 Whether the predictability of these changes in behaviour is certain or that 
nudging, by adding psychology to the matter, is just a little bit more than external 
persuasion, the reality is that this way of changing behaviour appeals to governments 
because of its alleged low-cost applicability, of its simplicity and apparent guarantee of 
success (based on ex ante / ex post research). 
 Having in mind the conceptual framework of Libertarian Paternalism noted 
above and its application process by use of nudges, I return to Rebonato’s definition of 
Libertarian Paternalism.  
 
“[It is] The set of interventions aimed at overcoming the unavoidable cognitive 
biases and decisional inadequacies of an individual by exploiting them in such a 
way as to influence her decisions (in an easy reversible manner) towards choices 
that she herself would make if she had at her disposal unlimited time and 
information, and the analytical abilities of a rational decision-maker (more 
precisely, of Homo-Economicus)”150 
 
 Under this definition, libertarian paternalists defend that: the knowledge of how 
Humans do decide and behave, against assumptions of how they ought to, if they were 
Econs, can and should be used to change the environment that people find themselves 
in.  
Automatic decisions, those that occur without due deliberation, can be 
counteracted151 by way of “choice architecture” and of “nudges” in order to align with 
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individuals’ deliberative preferences, i.e. preferences that, in retrospect, are what people 
really desire as “judged by themselves”. Thus, they do not imply to satisfy people’s 
revealed preferences, but rather what people “truly” prefer152. 
 Here libertarian paternalists demonstrate three different highly relevant beliefs; 
(1) that, in retrospect, they know what individuals’ “true” preferences are; (2) that 
policies done under this thesis are non-coercive because they’re reversible/optional and; 
(3) that Libertarian Paternalism becomes justified because it is proven that human 
beings don’t always act in their best-interest, often harming themselves.153  
  
“If individuals’ preferences are sensitive to framing, the planner’s choice of frame 
can affect the preferences that individuals reveal; there is no way of standing back 
and simply respecting preferences. Once the planner recognises this fact, she 
cannot avoid a decision about the direction in which to steer the individual, and the 
only reasonable criterion for making this decision is the planner’s judgement about 
the individual’s best interests. This is the sense in which there are no viable 
alternatives to paternalism. But because individuals remain free to ignore the 




2.3.1 Applications of Choice Architecture 
 Metaphorically nudges are presented as a GPS system155. A GPS indicates the 
best route to reach an intended place and it provides information about the best means to 
employ without forcing to take a recommended route. It serves as a mere suggestion, 
not an imposition, even though it is trying to steer someone towards a specific goal (set 
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by one’s self). Under this light, nudges are intended to focus on the means employed by 
individuals rather than the ends chosen.  
 As Libertarian Paternalists claim to approve only choice preserving policies, 
nudges cannot force, coerce or impose extensive costs on citizens. Measures that present 
themselves as hard forms of paternalism and therefore go against the maxim by which 
libertarians stand for, cannot be considered nudges. In short, they claim that their 
position is a means oriented soft form of paternalism156. With Libertarian Paternalism 
people’s true ends are not judged or changed, it is rather the means employed to achieve 
those ends that are.  
 What Sunstein and Thaler call “choice architects” are any of those people that 
have the capacity and responsibility to create the environments/contexts in which people 
make decisions. These authors assert that choice architecture is inevitable and 
everywhere157. The private sector, government, society on the whole, all play part in 
designing the social background in which choices are made. As it is impossible to live 
without a social background, they argue that choice architecture in unavoidable and as 
such paternalism is the only viable option158.  
 To be fair, libertarian paternalists admit that often conscientious choice 
architects don’t necessarily have people’s best interests in mind, designing 
environments in order to serve their own purposes. However, they believe that self-
consciously benevolent constructed nudges can steer people in the direction of their real 
preferences159.  
 To the extent that governments design policies under the belief that those 
affected by those same policies will behave in a certain way, policymakers fall under 
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the category of choice architects.  Both Sunstein and Thaler agree that in order to design 
efficient interventions, policymakers need to understand human behaviour. Only by 
understanding human psychology160 choice architecture can be effective in facilitating 
and improving people’s decisions towards their own well-being. The authors here are 
presuming that, when facing and recognising the inevitability of the impact their 
“designs” have on people, choice architects can, and will, create an environment where 
everyone will benefit. The “nudger” is thus a kind of benevolent king, “designing a 
garden maze that leads sinners to the right exit”161. As of yet, Sunstein and Thaler don’t 
seem to provide a concrete and substantial reason to why it is unviable for the choice 
architect to act with other priorities in mind aside from welfare.162   
 Furthermore, taking behavioural concepts discussed previously such as; anchors, 
availability, loss aversion, framing, the status-quo bias, hyperbolic discounting, etc., 
libertarian paternalists propose a number of applications of choice architecture in the 
form of nudges. The idea is to use psychological mechanisms that economists have 
traditionally regarded as non-rational, but which are evidenced to influence 
behaviour163. By engaging these behavioural mechanisms Thaler and Sunstein propose 
six different principles of choice architecture, and they claim that individuals actually 
want to make the choices they’re being nudged towards.  
 
“(…) bounded rationality and cognitive biases lead people to make what they 
themselves see as serious errors, or would see as serious errors after reflection, and 
choice architecture should be established to help make those errors less likely or 
less damaging”164 
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 Sunstein and Thaler in their book offer the word “nudge” as mnemonic device to 
remember their six principles of choice architecture, these serve as a guide to the choice 
architect. 
     
     iNcentives 
     Understand Mappings 
     Defaults 
     Give Feedback 
     Expect Error 
     Structure Complex Choices 
  
 To analyse these six principles in more detail it must be understood that they 
imply two different types of policy interventions, one is mostly non-intrusive and focus 
on providing information and on complementing traditional incentives.  In bringing 
behavioural insights to the provision of information libertarian paternalists propose to 
frame salient information in way of influencing behaviour.  The other type of nudge 
policy proposed by libertarian paternalists can be seen as more intrusive, as it offers to 
make choices for us, and to exploit behavioural insights to policymakers’ own 
advantage, this is the case of default rules.  
  
A. Defaults  
 Possibly the most prominent form of nudge policy in the literature are default 
rules. They intend to tackle a few heuristics that people seem prone to adhere to: the 
status quo-bias, inertia, procrastination, the ‘yeah whatever’ heuristic165, and so on. 
Robust empirical findings on human decision-making show that people tend to stick to 
any given situation. Either because individuals are lazy, fearful or just distracted they 
                                                 




prefer to stay with the status quo even when there are virtually no costs in changing to a 
better situation. This has been known and widely exploited by commercial and 
marketing businesses for their own benefit and people’s own demise.166 
 Some argue that default rules are inevitable167, there is always an initial status 
quo to any given situation. Libertarian paternalists propose that defaults can be used to 
nudge, under the knowledge that people tend to “stick” with whatever initial situation is 
provided for them. Furthermore, policies that rely on the setting of defaults preserve 
freedom of choice because people are still permitted to “opt out” and “reverse the 
nudge”. To public or private institutions, the implications that defaults stick, especially 
when people ignore them, make the option of setting specific defaults very attractive168.  
 For his part Sunstein believes that in any given policy the choice of the default, 
especially those involving automatic enrolments, should be analysed in detail by experts 
who are sufficiently informed169 and that take into consideration all possible variables. 
In this regard, he argues in favour of intelligently assigned default rules, having in mind 
that “when people trust the choice architect, automatic enrolment will be particularly 
sticky, but not so much when trust is low (...)”170 
 Sunstein differentiates between three different types of defaults: (1) impersonal 
default rules: default options that are set for a wide population, establishing what 
happens when people do nothing; (2) active choosing: where the choice is left for the 
individual, to Sunstein it can be either voluntary or mandated; and (3) personalized 
defaults: rules that are applied to specific members of a given population in order to fit 
the best option for those to which the default applies (this involves a process known as 
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narrowcasting which in the most extreme form can be applied to one specific 
individual).  
 When regarding the promise of personalized defaults, which he believes are the 
wave of the future and can attain large social benefits171, Sunstein proposes to use them 
to institute what he calls “personalized paternalism”172 - a form of paternalism that is 
able to create different policy interventions by narrowcasting groups and thus without 
threatening to infringe on society’s heterogeneity.  
Because personalized defaults are based in the retrieval of specific information 
about the people they’re trying to target (through predictive analytics), Sunstein admits 
the underlying threat regarding liberty.  These measures can be easily used to promote 
choice architects’ own interests173 and at the same time pose risks towards individual 
privacy.  Furthermore, because personalized defaults will be designed regarding past 
behaviour, such rules do not promote individual learning, nor broaden personal 
experience and perspectives174.   
 As for the application of impersonal defaults or active choosing, different 
situations must be thoroughly analysed. According to Sunstein, active choosing (to 
voluntarily make a decision) should be promoted in familiar situations where learning is 
a benefit and in areas where choice architects lack pertinent information. On the other 
hand, in the instance of a relatively heterogeneous population impersonal defaults 
become the most feasible to apply, especially in contexts that are unfamiliar to people 
and where individual learning is not deemed relevant175.  
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B. Expecting Error 
 When designing a policy, policymakers should expect humans to err. Different 
industries have realised, for some time, that to know common individual mistakes is 
highly relevant in designing efficient products. Only by understanding that 
forgetfulness, habits, automatic responses, lack of attention etc. lead people into 
systematic errors can a policy be designed to circumvent predictable mistakes, and 
consequently become more efficient.  
 This is not exactly new; policies, products, services have all been designed and 
redesigned in ways to get around constant nuisances. In the health industry, for 
example, making patients take the right medicine at the right time with the right 
frequency can be difficult176. The automatic system acknowledges that some rules are 
better than others177. As such, libertarian paternalists invite governments to study 
common human mistakes in way of designing policies that avoid them. One form to 
achieve this is by imposing frequent and constant practices, by for example creating 
habitual behaviour or providing immediate feedback. 
 
 C. Informational Interventions that Target our System 1 
 The other principles of choice architecture can rely on behavioural insights of 
saliency, of framing and disclosures. To the libertarian paternalist the provision of 
information has two levels of action; (1) where it educates, providing objective and all-
encompassing information involving our critical reasoning; (2) where it presents 
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selected information, specifically targeting people’s System 1 through the use of 
behavioural and psychological mechanisms (framing, saliency, anchoring, etc.). 
 To the libertarian paternalists, disclosures, leaflets and warnings can all 
highlight information that doesn’t account for all variables, nor give us “the full picture” 
necessary to analyse the decision at hand. As selecting the information becomes part of 
the role of public officials, and as they intend to use that information to, effectively, 
target our less-scrutinizing selves in order to nudge us towards our own well-being, 
Sunstein and Thaler assume these types of nudges as paternalistic. 
  Regarding incentives libertarian paternalists do not dismiss the role of 
traditional market incentives, but rather feel that they can complement them by using 
behavioural insights. This can be achieved by framing salient information in order to 
make people see the incentive at hand or the possibility of an incentive conflict. Public 
officials can thus “manipulate salience”178 in order to direct people’s attention to the 
incentive at hand, thus making it more effective, or so do paternalist claim. 
 
 So far, we have seen how nudges and choice architecture are a fundamental part 
to the practice of Libertarian Paternalism. Both these concepts serve as tools to create 
low-cost and simple policies, while allegedly preserving citizens’ freedom of choice by 
allowing the reversibility of, or possibility to ignore, those policies. By treating citizen’s 
as they are179, behavioural insights and knowledge about human psychology can, and 
should, be used to create effective interventions in accordance to citizens’ “true” 
preferences.  
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 Moreover, the underlying assumptions of Libertarian Paternalism are that human 
beings have bounded rationality and as such are prone to make mistakes when choosing. 
Under this light, they argue against a belief that individuals act in their best-interest and 
without harming themselves (casting doubts on Mill’s harm principle and suggesting 
that his “Epistemic Argument” is not always right)180. The idea is to engage with 
psychological mechanisms that economists have traditionally regarded as non-rational, 
and to influence choices that, in retrospect, individuals want to make181, but that they 
are unable to on their own. 
 Nudges are then proposed in ways to alter the behaviour of Humans without 
incurring costs on Econs’ behaviour. As such, these types of intervention target our 
System 1, hypothesised by Dual Process Theory, and are purposefully made to be 
ignored by the Homo Economicus182, who doesn’t suffer from limits in rationality.  
   
                                                 
180 Sunstein (2014a) 
181 Sugden (2017) 





Libertarian Paternalism in Practice 
 
 Throughout the literature of Libertarian Paternalism, specific nudges have been 
exemplified for implementation. Some of these examples have already been put into 
practice and are used to illustrate how simple and effective nudges can be.  Other 
examples are policy proposals by these paternalists, as the authors state that: “(…) many 
of the most important applications of Libertarian Paternalism are for government”183.  
 In this chapter my initial focus will be on specific proposals referenced in 
Sunstein and Thaler’s book: Nudge. These will show some type of interventions that the 
authors have in mind when proposing their thesis. Following that section, I propose to 
analyse three different nudging policies that have been implemented in the UK by The 
Behavioural Insights Teams (BIT), inspired by nudge theory and under the advisement 
of Richard Thaler. 
  
3.1 In ‘Nudge: Improving Decisions about health, wealth and happiness’ 
 
 There is some difficulty in understanding the scope of interventions that 
Libertarian Paternalism subscribes to. Some of the policy suggestions, whether private 
or public, fall under such disparate categories and touch on such a broad spectrum of 
themes that it becomes hard to define what is the ultimate objective of this thesis, and 
whether some proposed policies can be called paternalistic. As they claim and justify 
themselves under pretences of ameliorating behaviour and improving decisions, it 
seems pertinent to demonstrate different policy suggestions present throughout their 
literature.  
                                                 




At the same time some of their policies have been dismissed as they don’t seem 
at all relevant to our discussion184. In this dissertation I will try to focus on interventions 
that alter choices of relevant behaviour, nudges that libertarian paternalists assume easy 
to reverse or ignore, and that intend to target our less scrutinizing and more automatic 
selves. 
 
3.1.1 The Cafeteria185 
 The introduction of Sunstein and Thaler’s book presents a hypothetical case in 
order to demonstrate the impact of choice architecture and nudging: A director of a food 
services for a large city school system realises the power of influence over what 
students choose to eat by changing the arrangement of the food display in the cafeteria.  
  It is interestingly odd to notice that the first case presented for the introduction 
of Libertarian Paternalism depicts a children’s cafeteria. True, the authors are 
presenting an example that can be applied to any cafeteria, whether children’s or 
adults’186. However, it becomes relevant to note that in their most famous book, serving 
almost like a kind of manifesto, they choose the former. The “judged by themselves” 
clause seems to lose somewhat of its meaning187 as children tend to be considered not 
entirely responsible for their choices, at least not until they have reached the specific 
age of adulthood. Also, the use of this example stands out because the legal distinction 
between paternalism regarding children’s choices and that relating to adults seems to go 
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amiss188. Notwithstanding, let us consider some important aspects of this suggested 
intervention. 
 According to the authors, once the realisation is reached that a given planner has 
an enormous impact on individual choice by just displaying and arranging the food 
differently, then the choice architect (the planner) will have different options of 
conscious action to consider: 
 
1. Arrange the food to make students better off. 
2. Choose the food order at random. 
3. Try to arrange the food to get the kids to pick what they would choose 
on their own. 
4. Maximize the sales of the items from the suppliers who are willing to 
offer the largest bribes. 
5. Maximize profits189. 
 
 Thaler and Sunstein assume that the first option is the best, or better yet, that all 
other four options are far worse. They admit that it might be a paternalistic measure, 
perhaps a bit intrusive even, but by comparison the only viable option. Option 2 is 
immediately dismissed, it is completely unfeasible and raises questions to the 
practicality of what and how to arrange food at random. Planners and students have 
nothing to gain from random organizational criteria. 
 Also, the authors are here presenting the case of an “honourable and honest” 
character and as such option number 4, depicting the choice architect as relatively 
corrupt, must be dismissed. Once again, the presumption of a benevolent choice 
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architect stands, but here there’s the addendum of describing personal characteristics of 
the planner to justify their thesis. 
 Option number 5 is attractive and not at all withdrawn from reality, no one 
would question such practice (it is legitimate) but will only be put into practice if the 
cafeteria’s main goal and priority is profit. And it is here that the conundrum lies, 
should one try to maximise profits possibly resulting in unhealthier children and 
“especially since she works for the school district?”190 It seems that the relevance of 
presenting a school as an example is that it would be morally wrong to accept any other 
options besides number 1, as all the others options are deemed less worthy in respect to 
children’s welfare.  
 Option 3 is interesting to dissect. According to Sunstein and Thaler, it’s the one 
anti-paternalists would easily favour, but that the authors easily dismiss because it relies 
on ex ante preferences which from a behavioural standpoint do not exist – as we have 
seen that preferences are context-dependent191. Assuming that, not only one different 
arrangement, but that any arrangement will have an impact on people’s choices, the 
authors have concluded that there is no natural, “neutral” way of presenting choice – 
and as such people’s “true ‘preferences’ do not formally exist”192. 
 If this argument is right, then the problem is that real preferences cannot be truly 
observed, libertarian paternalists apparently are abandoning the methodology of 
analysing revealed preferences, the main empirical foundation for social sciences and 
for welfare interventions. At the same time, it seems that they’re adopting a more 
conceptual form of preference. In a more recent work Sunstein traces back an idea from 
Harry Frankfurt on acting according to what “we want to want” - our second-order 
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desires. If we act in order to satisfy our deepest values then we are acting according to 
our own free will193.  I will further analyse this implication in chapter 4. 
 Recalling option 1 and accepting it as true, that the arrangement of the food 
display has a direct impact on people’s choices of what they eat, then one can conclude 
as libertarian paternalists do, that even the slightest details affect people’s behaviour. 
From this the authors seem to extrapolate that a form of paternalism becomes 
unavoidable (against the first misconception of libertarians). 
 
“The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism. In 
many situations, some organization or agent must make a choice that will affect the 
behavior of some other people. There is, in those situations, no alternative to a kind 
of paternalism – at least in the form of an intervention that affects what people 
choose.”194  
 
 Again, we must understand with this that libertarian paternalists seem to imply 
that any form of influence on behaviour is paternalism, or what they call a “kind of 
paternalism” raising several questions on its own. But even accepting this argument, can 
we consider it wishful thinking, to presume as the only viable option available the 
paternalistic one? One can argue that some unconsidered options are still possible, no 
matter how preposterous they might sound. From a liberal standpoint, nothing should 
stop the choice architects from acting in their own self-interest, provided harm doesn’t 
come to others.  
                                                 
193 Sunstein (2016) p.86 “(…) free will exists when we make choices that fit with our own deepest 
values—those that we endorse after reflection. If you decide to become a doctor, to quit smoking, or 
to be a bit kinder in the workplace, you are probably exercising your free will. The philosopher Harry 
Frankfurt makes a distinction between what we want (a cigarette, a bit of extra sleep, a visit to the 
Dark Side) and what we want to want (no cigarettes, a little more work, the Light). Frankfurt argues 
that if we act in accordance with what he calls our second-order desires, we are exercising our free 
will. For Frankfurt, freedom has a lot to do with the ideal of self-mastery” p. 85 




Even when considering state interventions, one can still assume that the state has 
the capacity to act in its own interest. Democratic governments can indeed do this under 
risk of suffering the consequences from the opposition, from the electorate, from civil 
society, etc. For the libertarian paternalists it seems that their belief in the benevolence 
of planners is what makes it impossible for them to admit other viable solutions195.  
 
 3.1.2 Retirement Plans and the Save More Tomorrow Scheme 
 Standard economic theory assumes that regarding savings and retirement, people 
have the rational ability to save throughout their lives. Within Modigliani’s life cycle 
hypothesis, for example, one is expected to optimise consumption and saving patterns in 
order to maintain a balanced lifestyle. “[I]ndividuals accumulate and run down assets 
during their expected life cycle so as to maximise their lifestyle utility function”196. 
 For behavioural economists there lie two fundamental problems with this theory. 
First a mathematical one; there exists too many variables and complexities to calculate 
the analytical problem of how much to save in order to have a good life after retirement, 
especially considering that different calculus might apply to different individuals. Even 
with the most sophisticated software, economists and financial advisors still have 
difficulty in unanimously finding a correct savings rate197. 
  On the other hand, there is a problem of will-power, or lack thereof. As human 
beings are seen to have present bias and akrasia (failure of self-control), paternalists 
argue that “even if the correct savings rate were known, households might lack the self-
control to reduce current consumption in favour of future consumption”198. 
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  Evidence implying that people don’t act in their own best interests is extensive, 
especially in the case of saving towards the future. Individuals don’t actively enrol in 
beneficial plans that allow to save for retirement, even when there are little costs 
associated to such enrolment. This has been shown to happen, in defined-contribution 
plans, where the employee signs up of his free volition deciding on a specific rate of 
savings. But more surprisingly, this has also been noticed to happen in defined-benefit 
plans where the employees only have to sign up and the responsibility of providing 
towards a pension fund falls to the employers199.  
Under this evidence, libertarian paternalists assume that the decision to not 
participate in a retirement plan is a rational mistake.  
 
“By calling [people’s] low-saving behaviour a mistake, we mean that they might 
characterize the action the same way, just as someone who is 100 pounds 
overweight might agree that he or she weighs too much.”200 
 
 One way of tackling this issue is by making enrolment in a savings plan 
automatic, by making it the default rule. In 2001 Benartzi and Thaler presented a plan to 
overcome this irrational conundrum of why people don’t save towards retirement. The 
Save More Tomorrow (SMT) scheme intends for people to commit, beforehand, 
portions of their future salary increases allocated towards their retirement savings. With 
this scheme, people are offered a plan in which their savings rate go up by 3 percentage 
points every time they get a pay raise and where a typical pay raise is between 3.25 and 
3.50 per cent. If a person continues with this scheme for years of pay raises, their saving 
rates will constantly increase. 
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  They propose to do this by way of exploiting three known cognitive bias: (1) by 
overcoming people’s present bias or hyperbolic discounting, which assumes that people 
attach particular weight to the immediate present time in detriment of their future. (2) by 
using to their own advantage the generalized poor understanding of the difference 
between nominal and real income through a combination of money illusion and loss 
aversion; and (3) by taking advantage of inertia and procrastination in order to 
maintain people in their scheme once they sign up. 
 
“ [P]resence of bounded rationality suggests that the program should be simple and 
should help people approximate the life cycle saving rate if they are unable to do so 
themselves. Hyperbolic discounting implies that opportunities to save more in the 
future will be considered more attractive than those in the present. Procrastination 
and inertia suggest that once employees are enrolled in the program, they should 
remain in until they opt out.  
 The final behavioral factor that should be considered in designing a prescriptive 
savings plan is loss aversion, the empirically demonstrated tendency for people to 
weigh losses significantly more heavily than gains”201 
 
 It is implied then that the authors are not proposing to explain or help people 
overcome these decisional blunders, they rather use them to their advantage by the 
generalized lack of financial literacy. When regarding possibilities of education in this 
matter libertarian paternalists agree that “unfortunately, the evidence does not suggest 
that education is in and of itself, an adequate solution”202. Thus, they don’t consider that 
helping employees make better financial decisions on their own is viable, but instead 
prefer to “take advantage” of people’s cognitive mistakes in order to increase their 
savings.  
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Furthermore, given the difficult computation of the “right” saving rate even for 
rational selves, as admitted by the libertarian paternalists, Benartzi and Thaler assume 
that their defined savings rate (almost everything of their pay raise) will satisfy the 
employees’ preferences. 
 Moreover, when considering the advantages of inertia, the status quo bias and 
procrastination, one can entertain a critical view of this libertarian paternalistic 
proposal. As they claim these biases to be strong influences on behaviour, we can 
assume that when imposing a given plan on people’s lives, compliance is due to inertia 
itself. However, libertarian paternalists claim that the extremely high take-up rate of 
their choice (after their measures) is in itself an endorsement of how the choices they 
promote are what people truly want.  
 
“The vast majority of those enrolled in the SMarT plan (80 percent) remained in it 
through the fourth pay raise, and (3) the average saving rates for SMarT program 
participants increased from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent over the course of 40 
months.” 203 
 
 By behavioural standards, this high rate of acceptance does not prove much 
about the preservation of choice, as cognitive biases go both ways204. In accepting that 
these cognitive biases and heuristics are intrinsic to behaviour, and by aligning people 
with a specific, not fully transparent plan, libertarian paternalists could impose measures 
that people “truly” hate and yet don’t change because of their decisional blunders205.  
Considering that almost everybody (80%) under this plan stayed with it for four 
consecutive pay raises (whereupon the contributions only stopped because they had 
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reached the maximum amount allowed to contribute) one can conclude, as the 
libertarian paternalists do, that employees, once enrolled, either saw the benefits of the 
plan and in retrospect stayed with it because it was what they truly wanted. Another 
person might reach a different conclusion, perhaps it was their decisional blunders, not 
their preferences, that made them stick with the SMT scheme, and maybe employees 
intended to change their options but somehow never got around to do it206. As the 
authors admitted to design the SMT in order to take advantage of the status quo bias 
and inertia it is entirely feasible to argue in favour of the latter. 
 Furthermore, the SMT scheme is designed as a response to people’s tendencies 
to not actively save for their retirement. However, their proposal is not to actively save 
for retirement but rather, to put aside future pay increases. In their dual-self model of 
present-self and future-self, they prioritize individuals’ future to the possible detriment 
of their present, as they seem to assume the future-self to depict “true” preferences207. 
They do so by exploiting the generalized poor understanding of the difference between 
nominal and real income.  
 They claim that by using future pay increases individuals will never see their 
incomes going down and so won’t perceive any losses, taking advantage of loss 
aversion at the cost of being unable to enjoy future pay rises. They sell their programme 
without mentioning or alluding to the fact that in committing future pay increases to a 
savings plan, individuals “nominally-non-decreasing future pay cheque will have a 
smaller and smaller purchasing power”208. Benartzi and Thaler are not trying to 
overcome people’s inability to focus beyond what they receive in the form of money, 
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but exploit the fact that people dismiss how their economic condition is affected, not 
merely by the money they receive, but by their purchasing power. As employees never 
see their pay check go down, they will never perceive any losses, and therefore consider 
the plan a win-win situation. 
 The SMT programme had initially a participation rate of 80 percent in 
environments where financial advisors met with people personally and recommended 
participation in the savings plan. By contrast, participation has been rather low where a 
person needs to decide independently and find a specific plan to participate in. One of 
the paternalistic proposals in response to this is to combine the SMT plan with 
automatic enrolment209. Libertarian paternalists also invite governments to “incorporate 
a Save More Tomorrow feature into a national savings plan. Workers would be 
automatically enrolled in a pension plan in which the amounts devoted to savings would 
increase with increases in wages”210   
 
 3.2 The British Movement 
 
  In 2010, just before David Cameron took office, he gave a talk where he 
expressed his belief in being at the verge of a revolution in the way of government. 
According to him, “with the very simple conservative thought of going with the grain of 
human nature, you can achieve so much more”211. As he went on to briefly explain the 
vast developments that have occurred in behavioural economics and psychology, he 
stated that to “treat [people] as they are, not as government wants them to be”212 might 
be the key to tackle individual behaviour in a way to improve welfare with little costs 
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associated. David Cameron was here referring to the introduction of behavioural 
sciences into the development of policymaking in the United Kingdom.  
With the appointment of David Cameron as the new prime-minister at the head 
of the then Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, the Behavioural Insights Team 
(BIT) was created. Informally known as the “nudge unit” BIT was, at that stage, the 
world’s first policy dedicated central government behavioural unit213. 
 It seems pertinent to highlight that since BIT was formed in 2010 different 
behavioural public policy units have been consistently integrated into government 
departments, many adopting (not exclusively) policy interventions under nudge theory. 
In 2015 the World Bank Development Report retained a large interest in behavioural 
public policy and initiated the Global Insights Team214. The following year the 
European Commission released a report with the following introductory remark: 
 
“From a policy perspective, relying on unrealistic assumptions about people’s 
behaviour may have severe consequences. If people’s behaviour is primarily due to 
lack of knowledge or information, then conventional education or information 
campaigns could constitute an appropriate remedy. If, on the other hand, people’s 
behaviour reflects fundamental aspects of human nature (such as default bias, 
present bias, loss aversion, overconfidence etc.), a more effective approach would 
be to take such behavioural features into account when designing policy. 
Identifying the reasons underpinning people’s behaviour is therefore an essential 
prerequisite for effective policy making.”215 
 
 This major shift seems to have occurred with the publication of Nudge. 
However, it is wrong to assume that nudging is the only form of policies adopted by 
these behavioural units, it is merely contended as “one of the several behavioural 
techniques policymakers can use to direct people to better choices without using bans or 
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other expensive time-consuming alternatives”.216 Thus, it seems pertinent to highlight 
that since Thaler and Sunstein’s book was published, there have been many new 
developments in behavioural public policy. 
 Interest in the implementation of BIT might have originated with Sunstein and 
Thaler’s work. Yet, its intellectual foundation traces back to a more recent report 
released in 2010 by the Cabinet Office and Institute for Government known as the 
“Mindspace Report”. Many of the authors in this report would eventually be part of the 
nudge unit alongside Richard Thaler who would join the team later on. 
 Following the lines of Libertarian Paternalism, they argued in favour of a soft 
touch to policy, under pretences of behavioural insights, intending to go with the grain 
of human nature and not against it217. Similarly, the Mindspace report was given its 
name by its different guiding principles: 
 
 Messenger: We are heavily influence by who communicates information. 
 Incentives: Our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental 
shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses. 
 Norms: We are strongly influenced by what others do. 
 Defaults: We “go with the flow” of pre-set options. 
 Salience: Our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us. 
 Priming: Our acts are often influenced by subconscious cues. 
 Affect: Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions. 
 Commitments: We see to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate 
acts. 
 Ego: We act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves. 
 
 
 According to the authors these effects (insights from laboratory and field 
research in social psychology) seemed to be the most robust for tackling behaviour 
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originating, not exclusively, on automatic responses.218 The Mindspace report would 
then be used by BIT as a “framework to aid the application of behavioural science to the 
policymaking process”219. 
 As noted, some of the authors of this report would eventually form the Team and 
by adapting the concept of nudges and the characteristics of the Mindspace framework, 
they would conduct behavioural field research in order to suggest possible policies. 
Ultimately, BIT became a government department220 that specifically used empirical 
research and randomised controlled trials to assess what could be the most effective 
policies regarding different themes, making ex post suggestions to government for 
potential policies. 
 It should be noted that, even though it departed from a paternalistic standpoint, 
the Team’s research often focussed not only on individuals’ “own welfare” but on a 
general idea of social welfare too. Some argue that this was purposefully done to gather 
broader public support, which might have been curtailed if offering policies which 
focused only on affecting people’s own behaviour221. The “Mindspace” authors also 
highlighted the fact that, due to their policies’ nature, citizens might not be fully 
cognisant that their behaviours are being targeted. They concluded that this might leave 
governments open to charges of manipulation222. 
 
 
                                                 
218 Ibid.; see also Dolan, P. (2010). Influencing the Financial Behaviour of individuals: the mindspace 
way in A. Oliver (Ed.) Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge 
University Press 
219 Retrieved from BIT’s official website: http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/mindspace/ 
(last accessed Nov. 2018) 
220 In 2014 the Behavioural Insights Team was no longer part of the Cabinet Office, it became a social 
purpose company, part of a joint venture between the UK government, Nesta (the innovation charity), 
and the team’s own staff. 
221 Oliver (2017) 




3.3 The Behavioural Insights Team in Practice 
 
 The Behavioural Insights Team in the U.K. was, in a way, intended to be the 
practical application of Libertarian Paternalism to government. As such, in analysing 
policy proposals by this team I will mainly focus on measures that have either been 
mentioned by libertarian paternalists, or that fall under the scope of Libertarian 
Paternalism as it has previously been defined. 
 
 3.3.1 Organ Donation 
 The case of organ donation is mentioned throughout the literature, including in 
Sunstein and Thaler’s textbook Nudge, who use this policy intervention as the perfect 
example for applying mandated choice or impersonalized defaults. How it can be 
considered a form of paternalism might be confusing, as it focuses on deceased 
donation and evidently, donation of organs does not imply benefits for one’s own well-
being, a matter that will be further addressed in chapter 4. 
 Notwithstanding, taking from the successful example of Illinois and other states 
in the USA, in 2011 BIT (alongside other government departments) conducted a pilot-
study of prompted choice223 when an individual applied online for the DVLA – Driver 
Vehicle Licensing Agency224. In short, upon online application to get or renew a 
driver’s licence, a person was prompted to decide whether they wanted or not, to be an 
organ donor.  
 Since 2013 prompted choice, or mandated choice as Sunstein and Thaler call it, 
has been the main practice in the UK. When applying for the DVLA (whether online or 
physical application) the applicant must decide if they want to donate their organs.                 
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An application cannot be submitted until the decision to become an organ donor (or not) 
is made.  
 Having this in mind, mandated choice, i.e. to force one to choose, can be argued 
to cross the line from a soft measure of paternalism, to a somewhat harder intervention. 
Even though a person is not being forced to choose a particular answer (the paternalists 
are not forcing what to choose) and a person is still fully capable of deciding to be, or 
not to be an organ donor, there are still too many coercive variables in this type of 
measure. Aside from the more obvious fact of conditioning their choice by making 
hostage what the person wants (in this case the driver’s licence) we can also take into 
account the detrimental aspect to those who might feel embarrassed in deciding, and 
claiming publicly, that they don’t want to become donors225. Also, in forcing to choose 
at a particular time of one’s life, there might be imposed costs on future selves, in the 
case of regret for example. 
 Later, with the same goal in mind, BIT conducted, at the time, the largest 
randomised controlled trial in the UK in order to compare the effectiveness of different 
appeals to organ donation226. Following principles of advertisement, using a high-traffic 
government webpage the Team displayed eight different short messages as an appeal to 
donate organs, each message linking to the official organ donation website. A first 
message displayed for the control group which only read as “Thank you. Please join the 
NHS donor register.” while the other seven messages used behavioural insights. They 
formulated their messages using tools of social proof227, of reciprocity, by exploiting 
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loss aversion and by employing imagery “to see whether [they] could increase the 
salience of the messages using visual cues”228  
 The conclusions of the report went on to say that the best results drew on 
messages of reciprocity, loss and social proof. They estimated that in the course of one 
year, as many as 96.000 more people would register to donate organs when comparing 
to the control group message. These messages that appeal to our subconscious cues, 
have been included in government websites alongside a “share” your decision on social 
media to provide for more social proof229. 
 Interestingly, England has recently conducted a public consultation230 that ended 
in March 2018, on whether to make organ donation the default rule, imposing an “opt 
out” option for those who don’t want to donate their organs. This measure of presumed 
consent will apparently be in place from 2020231. England is not the first country to 
consider this form of presumed consent of organ donation which is becoming more 
attractive to governments due to its proven efficacy. In 2015, Wales became the first 
nation in the UK to adopt this type of policy, but for years Austria, Belgium, Portugal, 
France and others have worked under a policy of presumed choice as the default which I 
shall analyse in more detail in the next chapter.  
  
 3.3.2 Employment 
 In trying to help people back into work, BIT designed a few changes to the 
process of applications at job centres. With the same methodology of a randomised 
control trial the team divided about two thousand jobseekers into two different groups, 
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the control – where application process had no change – and the trial with a different 
process of application.  
 The differences in processing between the control and the treatment group were 
quite simple; on the first day of application, instead of filling seemingly endless forms, 
the claimant was guaranteed a conversation with a job advisor, which normally would 
only happen within two weeks. In that conversation a plan was devised between the two 
about what would be done for the next two weeks.  
 
“Encouraging claimants to focus on making specific commitments to future 
activities, linked to their daily routines, helped them to follow through on their job 
search intentions”232.   
 
If after 8 weeks the person still hadn’t gotten a job, proposals for “building 
psychological resilience and well-being through ‘expressive writing’ and ‘strengths 
identification’” 233 was advised. The results of the first trial showed significant effects. 
After 13 weeks of initial application, jobseekers in the treatment group were 20% more 
likely to be off benefits in comparison to the treatment group. Under this conclusion the 
pilot study broadened its intervention area, eventually leading to the training of over 
25.000 advisors and to instituting the commitment devices to all job centres234. 
 This is the perfect example of a less intrusive and more libertarian form of 
nudge policy that uses informational interventions and simple non-monetary incentives. 
The government here is merely providing better institutional support under light of 
behavioural evidence using, for example, the effectiveness of pre-commitment 
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strategies235, of providing direct feedback, of framing and mapping choices in the 
direction of welfare. However, some aspects of this measure must be considered, 
especially regarding the possibility of government abuse of these behavioural tools 
which goes unconsidered within the theoretical approach of Libertarian Paternalism.   
 Of course, we depart from the assumption that a jobseeker truly wants to find a 
job and so will comply with any form of institutional support that is offered, especially 
if in the form of nudges which tend to offer simpler means. Notwithstanding, during the 
pilot-study, job advisors were apparently implying that if claimants didn’t subscribe to 
using their tools of “expressive writing and strengths identification” they would lose 
their benefits236.  
 The implication of suffering penalties when there’s no compliance with a 
jobseeker’s plan, adds a much more restrictive and less libertarian condition to this 
measure. It creates difficulties for the jobseeker to ignore the nudge as easily as implied 
by Sunstein and Thaler in their theoretical approach.  
The Behavioural Insights Team did come out publicly claiming that such 
conditions were not envisioned for the study and so perhaps this implication was 
unfounded. As it is impossible to truly know whether this adjacent condition was 
intended by BIT, or if it happened due to an unaccounted human variable; I turn now to 
analyse the fact that the psychometric test, offered to jobseekers to build “psychological 
resilience” and to find their “strengths” was not scientifically validated in anyway237, 
seemingly a mere tool to keep jobseekers occupied and to target their automatic biases.  
 When pressed for an official response regarding this accusation the Department 
of Work and Pensions came out publicly and stated that the test used was “intended to 
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help jobseekers identify their strengths” and that they had had “extremely positive 
feedback from both jobseekers and their advisers – it is right that we use every tool we 
have to help jobseekers who want to work find a job”238 
 Notwithstanding the good results of this trial, that an increase by 20% in the 
probability of jobseekers finding jobs is no small feat, we still have to consider the 
implications that this successful endeavour presents. The mere fact that those 
participating in this trial had no knowledge nor consented to being part of it raises 
ethical questions239, but taking into consideration the statement that it is “right” for 
government departments to “use every tool available to help”,  even demanding time 
and commitment from citizen’s to respond to fake tests and threatening those who don’t 
comply with penalties, then we can see a fundamental detachment from the theoretical 
view of Libertarian Paternalism and its practical application240.  
 From a behavioural standpoint, as public officials are human and therefore can 
suffer from the same infinite heuristics and bias as other individuals, we cannot dismiss 
the possibility of failures in policymaking. Interpreting evidence in the wrong way, not 
taking into consideration possible human variables in the application of nudges, and 
suffering from the same cognitive biases and heuristics as other individuals can lead 
public officials to create unwarranted policies.241 
 
 3.3.3 Education 
 Since its implementation BIT has been trying to increase university applications 
and enrolment, especially in good-grade students from disadvantaged social 
backgrounds that have a relatively low rate of university application (lower than 20%). 
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As such they devised different field experiments trying to find nudges that could change 
this reality.  
  
“Attending university is a life-changing opportunity that can bring high returns to 
both the individual and country (…). 
The government has set clear goals on widening participation in higher education: 
to double the proportion of people from disadvantaged backgrounds entering 
university in 2020 compared to 2009, and to increase the number of black and 
minority ethnic (BME) students going to university by 20%.”242 
 
 In one of the concluded trials, BIT postulated that, by sending a modelled letter 
to target students by framing the advantages and explaining why they should apply to 
higher education – the perfect embodiment of an informational non-intrusive nudge -  
they could steer students to enrol.  
The results of this particular randomised control test weren’t very successful, 
albeit positive. They concluded that a personal message, signed by a real person and 
addressed to the student directly, had a better effect in making students enrol in 
university243. But even considering the low rate of success, it still seems pertinent to 
further analyse the experiment for the implications that this policy proposal possibly 
carries for decisional autonomy. 
 As it focused on a very specific group – good students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds – this form of policy becomes what Sunstein calls “personalized 
paternalism”244. A form of paternalism that does not apply measures to all, but rather to 
specific, narrowed groups. This type of measure is done in ways of preserving 
heterogeneity. To the libertarian paternalists this form of policy design is becoming 
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available due to different technological advancements and to the collection of individual 
information on many fronts, serving the purpose of avoiding the “one-size-fits all” 
approach that traditional paternalism imposes245.  
 In analysing this case-study one can admit that it does not impose a wide based 
intervention, as it stipulates a given group with a defined criterion (disadvantaged 
backgrounds, good-grade students). However, one can still argue that this level of 
narrowcasting is still wide enough to disrespect heterogeneity. As this initiative tackles 
everyone in the group as a unit, assuming that all involved would, not only benefit from 
attending university, but also that they want to attend, the policymakers are 
continuously dismissing the subjectivity and diversity of individual preferences.  
 For the sake of argument let us accept that by narrowing a demographic one can 
fully respect heterogeneity and individuality, it is still possible to analyse other ways in 
which this type of intervention imposes relevant costs to our decisional autonomy, 
especially if made by using more covert nudges.    
 Contrary to the previous measures discussed above, here we are admittedly 
faced with the perfect example of a libertarian nudge, where young students are entirely 
free to ignore the nudge and none of their options are directly hindered by it. No one is 
forcing these students to regard or accept the information being provided, or even to 
account for it in their decisional process but let us assume that they do. Let us suppose 
that some of these young people did enrol in university, specifically due to this nudge. 
Not because they made the decision on their own grounds, nor because they 
complemented the nudge with other pertinent information or because they did their own 
independent research (Libertarian Paternalism intends to target our automatic systems of 





thought and not necessarily provide better and more accurate information to 
complement information that’s already available).   
 Then, let us imagine that the student who enrolled in university merely based on 
a government message, regrets246 the decision and is now forced to reverse the nudge. 
Considering all the costs that are associated with university247 it seems plausible to 
assume that the easy-reversibility of such a measure is not as straightforward as implied 
by libertarian paternalists. The consequences of such a decision have a much bigger 
impact on the individual than a simple nudge should impose. In assuming to know 
individuals’ true preferences and in accepting the benevolence of planners, libertarian 
paternalists seem to dismiss the possible implications of such measures on individuals 
that are nudged towards being “worse off” "as judged by themselves"248. 
 If the decision were to be made by one’s own desire and assessment, by their 
own research and consideration, one would more likely assume the responsibility over 
any regrets, mistakes or costs associated with that, relatively, autonomous choice249. 
However, if a decision is made by being, unknowingly, subjected to a nudge that uses 
knowledge of our impulsive psychology to influence us to make the choice that didn’t 
fit at all, to whom the responsibility of the outcome falls on becomes less evident.  
 Furthermore, policymakers are supposed to design the most effective policies 
possible. Thus, we can presume that when testing these measures BIT is wanting them 
to have the best results possible in order to comply with governments objectives. As a 
government sets targets, a policymaker’s role becomes to employ the best means to 
meet those (in this case to increase university enrolment). In this trial the experiment 
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wasn’t as effective as intended, but the government’s target to increase enrolment still 
exists, and so one can only assume that other attempts at designing more effective 
policies will be made. These future policies might put other non-intrusive nudges in 
practice, but the space has been left open for governments to use less salient means and 
involve further surreptitious interventions.  
Because libertarian paternalists are inviting governments to take advantage of 
our behavioural shortcomings, the risk of a slippery slope that all kinds of paternalism 
entail250 remains present, alongside the risk of government abuse over manipulative 
means of persuasion.251 
 
From default-rules to the use of non-intrusive nudges that only frame 
information in order to impact choice. From policies that are theoretically libertarian but 
that in practice, due to various human and real-life variables, impose conditions not 
previously accounted for; we have seen in this chapter applications of Libertarian 
Paternalism proposed either by its theoretical fathers or by government departments. 
 Having in mind these practical applications and the context of Libertarian 
Paternalism that was discussed in chapter 2, I shall now turn to the final chapter of this 
dissertation where I hope to critically present some of the implications that this novel 
form of paternalism carries for political and individual freedom. 
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Libertarian Paternalism and Liberty 
 
 In this chapter I will focus on exploring the different implications of how 
Libertarian Paternalism can affect individual liberty and autonomy as it was understood 
by Mill, whose ideas were presented earlier in chapter 1. Initially I will expose some 
underlying beliefs of Libertarian Paternalism that have deeply influenced their proposal. 
 Considering these influences, we will then see some of the problems that 
Libertarian Paternalism entails regarding liberty. Problems highlighted by the fact that 
their position assigns no weight to freedom beyond the narrow focus of choice 
preservation as opposed to the possibility of actual decision-making252. 
 
4.1 Existing problems with Libertarian Paternalism (in practice and in theory) 
 
 4.1.1 Interpreting the Empirical Evidence 
 It would be wrong to assume that there are no limitations to the retrieval of 
empirical evidence. Laboratory behavioural research is not without flaws, and any 
retrieved conclusions might lack external validity, i.e. not translate into the outside 
world. As it stands, much of these behavioural experiments are done in academic 
environments and mostly with university students, making it plausible to assume that in 
some instances there can lack a concrete assessment of real behaviour, as it has been 
observed that some biases analysed in sterile settings do not actually survive exposure 
to the real world253.  
 Even natural experiments done on the field by use of randomised control trials 
or conducted through the use of questionnaires can be challenged by plausible 
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arguments254. For example, randomised control tests done in real environments can be 
challenged as there is no way of showing, with certainty, that the different results 
between those two groups came from the treatment or from the diverse uncontrollable 
factors that are involved in influencing behaviour255. As such, we can expect for there to 
be some mistakes in interventions that are based on misinterpreted evidence. 
Notwithstanding, it would still be foolish to disregard all that has been studied in the 
different behavioural fields, but even accepting all that has come to light as 
unquestionable, one can still argue in favour of a different conclusions when faced with 
the research at hand.  
 In chapter 2, I briefly mentioned the difference between the two schools of 
thought that have originated from behavioural psychology; the bounded rationality 
school originating with Herbert Simon, and the behavioural economics school that 
despite being influenced by Simon is more easily traced to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work. 
 Both these schools maintain that people do not act according to neoclassical 
rational choice models due to departures from Bayesian reasoning and from the axioms 
of expected utility theory. The behavioural economics school looks at these departures 
as systematic “errors” that constrain our capacity to maximize our utility, thus making 
us choose “erroneously”. The bounded-rationality school doesn’t conclude in the same 
vein, but rather claims that the use of heuristics can still produce good results, perhaps 
even almost as good as if obeying neoclassical paradigms256. Thus, the distinction 
between both schools hinges on the different interpretations of the quality of the 
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outcomes. Outcomes which, in the case of those subscribing to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s view, justify the call for paternalistic interventions.  
 Notwithstanding, there is a second distinction inherent to both schools of 
thought: the role of evolutionary adaptiveness. Even though behavioural economists 
understand the role of human adaptation in the origin of our cognitive biases257, they 
dismiss it as unimportant. For the bounded rationality school, this adaptiveness 
characteristic is of great importance. Decision-making might sometimes be fast and 
automatic, consequently leading to less than optimal results, but that does not 
necessarily mean that the choice must be dismissed. In an evolutionary sense, those 
automatic and intuitive processes must be reasonable, in order to have survived. 
 Remembering the Linda problem in chapter 2, the bounded rationality view 
claims that there is rational inference in replying that Linda is most likely a “bank teller 
and active in the feminist movement” because of a “relevance maxim”258. When 
considering what Linda is most likely to be, people assume that all the information 
given is relevant to the problem because when faced with those types of questions the 
chooser’s interpretation of “probability” departs from the mere mathematical standpoint. 
To answer only with what is mathematically more probable renders the characters’ 
descriptions pointless and wasteful.  As the audience assumes that communicators are 
meeting social standards of communication, they infer that all information is relevant to 
their alternative understanding of probability259.  In that instance, it would be more than 
reasonable to ask why waste time describing someone’s intrinsic characteristics if those 
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are not even relevant to the problem? By answering the least likely option all the 
information becomes consistent and social standards are met260.  
 
 4.1.2 Notes on Rationality  
 Even though behavioural sciences are, allegedly, shedding a new light on 
economic assumptions, it is plausible to argue that, they are merely providing empirical 
proof to sustain timeless assumptions about human behaviour. Considering different 
literary or academic works from various times, one can assume that decision makers 
have always been viewed as rationally bounded, albeit with the potential to overcome 
those limits. Whether in fiction, poetry, philosophy, etc. rationality was not understood 
as the only cause that motivated action. The two-selves that cognitive psychology is 
now theorising about, have been present long before the birth of that modern science. 
Even in economics Adam Smith recognised the “impartial spectator” and he speculated 
about what are now being called cognitive biases261.  
 Fiction authors have also described humans’ “predilections to err”, with what is 
now being called over-confidence, the endowment effect, the availability heuristic, 
limited attention, etc.262 The so called status quo bias is almost always present within 
the story arc of the hero’s journey – where the hero refuses the call to adventure usually 
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because of engagements in his life or his fears263. Even different traditional and cultural 
sayings seem to convey our behavioural shortcomings264.  
 It stands to reason that behavioural scientists are not postulating anything new at 
all, most certainly not a different view of human nature, but they are rather providing 
empirical proof to what was already, speculatively, known by “grandmothers”265 
everywhere, taking it as a literal depiction of how the human brain works which in turn 
allows them to separate the individual in two266.  
  As we have seen, liberals like Mill or Berlin, don’t claim that the individual is 
incapable of making mistakes, but rather understand that government should not 
interfere even when facing citizen’s self-imposed harms (internalities) in the form of 
bad choices for our future selves. Mill in On Liberty, accounts for some of the irrational 
“desires and impulses” of human behaviour. However, he accepts them as an intrinsic 
part of Man, of “human nature”.  
 
“(...) To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: 
but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should 
be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is 
anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a 
perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only 
perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is 
developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain 
weak and inactive.”267 
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 So why do libertarian paternalists view these evidenced decisional blunders, 
speculated for centuries, as a justification for a new form of paternalism? The answer is 
threefold, and relates to rooted beliefs that influence their position:  first, their definition 
of rationality; second, their view of the two selves (apparently a literal take on Dual 
Process Theory)268; and lastly, their concept of second-order desires, or what Sugden 
more appropriately calls, our latent preferences. Paternalism becomes justified because 
humans269 are unable to freely achieve what their rational selves truly want without 
outside intervention, to act according to their deep values. 
  
 4.1.3 Libertarian Paternalists’ definition of Rationality 
 When contemplating what the libertarian paternalists define as rational choice 
one can use their extensive literature and conclude that in the case of rationality, they 
subscribe to the neoclassical postulate of Homo Economicus270. 
 
“Research by psychologists and economists over the past three decades has raised 
questions about the rationality of the judgements and decisions that individuals 
make. People do not exhibit rational expectations, fail to make forecasts that are 
consistent with Bayes’ rule, use heuristics that lead them to make systematic 
blunders, exhibit preference reversals (...) and make different choices depending on 
the wording of the problem.”271 
  
 However, the rationality of the economic man is incredibly rigid, “any deviation 
from the one accepted way of choosing rationally is, for neoclassical economists (…) an 
error. (…) Irrational decisions are ‘mistakes’”272. Thus, by purposefully using such a 
restrictive definition of rationality they leave the field open to claim that any decision 
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made against this model is a mistake, consequently the individual is left worse off and 
they find justification for intervention, which allows me to turn now to another 
paternalistic belief, individual preferences. 
 
 4.1.4 On Preferences 
 For the libertarian paternalist preferences are context-dependent, this means that 
people’s decisions change when faced with seemingly irrelevant aspects of a given 
context273 (for example the display of food in a cafeteria). This preference inconsistency 
justifies paternalism, to the extent that people don’t have “well-formed preferences”274, 
however it does not justify why the error-free latent preference should be favoured 
instead of the revealed one275. 
 Libertarian paternalists assume that choice architects should plan in order to 
make individuals better off “as judged by themselves”276. The implication here is not 
only that they assume to know what people’s true preferences are, but that these 
preferences are revealed, not in observed choice, but in the decisions that individuals 
would make if they were completely rational. 
 
“Drawing on some well-established finding we show that in many cases, individuals 
make pretty bad decisions – decisions that they would not have made if they had paid full 
attention and possessed complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete 
self-control”277 
 
 In essence, when Sunstein and Thaler call on paternalism to steer individuals in 
favour of their “true” preferences, they are creating a normative criterion for the choice 
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architect to reconstruct people’s “error-free latent preferences and recommend policies 
that satisfy those preferences”278. Libertarian Paternalism designs policies that respond 
to what the reflective self (System 2) “would actually want”279. 
 From a liberal standpoint the problem with this argument lies in that the planner, 
an objective external observer, is legitimizing their intervention because their goal is to 
satisfy hypothetical choices of an inner rational self, who interacts with the world 
through an error prone “psychological shell”280.   Furthermore, by stipulating that the 
criteria for paternalism is people’s welfare "as judged by themselves"281, the authors 
make their task harder, as it is impossible for an outside objective view to know what 
people’s true judgements are. With this, they are conflating rationality with the 
promotion of welfare. However, rationality does not require, in any way, the promotion 
of a perceived objective welfare, for it’s still true that one person might choose 
rationally, i.e. according to their “true” preferences, something which the objective 
observer might see as an “irrational choice”282.   
 Going back to Mill, who also assumes that, sometimes, there is a divergence 
between revealed desires and well-being, that revealed preferences should not be 
understood as evidence as to what is best for the individual, it is interesting to see how 
he became such an arduous defendant of liberty where the neo-paternalists did not. Even 
considering the lower desires of men, he still held that: 
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 “his most fundamental moral commitment is to the ‘free development of 
individuality’ as ‘one of the leading essentials of well-being’. For Mill, each human 
being must achieve well-being in his own way, acting on his own judgement”283 
 
 In accepting emerging empirical evidence, libertarian paternalists are dismissing 
revealed preferences as a model to know people’s desires, claiming that individuals are 
ruled by cognitive biases and that their preferences are context-dependent. In doing so, 
they have challenged the “Epistemic Argument of the harm principle”, which asserts 
that: “because individuals know their tastes and situations better than officials do, they 
are in the best position to identify their own ends and the best means of obtaining 
them”284.   
 Furthermore, by including the promotion of subjective preferences as a guide to 
paternalism and by believing that those preferences go hand in hand with an objective 
measure of welfare, it can be argued that libertarian paternalists are still acting on 
grounds of what Mill calls “general presumptions”285.  
 Even accepting the idea of rational latent preferences, policymakers should 
never assume to know what those are, nor infer that because people are acting 
(obviously) against286 their own well-being they are acting erroneously. Especially 
considering that some individuals choose rationally what others see as “irrational”287. 
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 “The inevitability of policy errors derives from the insurmountable theoretical and 
empirical obstacles to identifying any one person’s, let alone the distribution of all 
persons’, “true preferences.” One type of policy error will occur when a behavioral 
intervention is aimed at seemingly irrational behavior that is in fact rational for the 
decision maker in question. In other words, the social costs of this type of policy 
error flow from encouraging behavior the paternalist inaccurately believes will 
make individuals better off and concomitantly discouraging acts that satisfy their 
actual preferences.” 288  
 
4.1.5 The Libertarian Paternalists’ Two-Selves Picture 
 Regarding the ideas of rationality and preferences we find, within the libertarian 
paternalist literature, a constant tension between the two conflicting selves of Dual 
Process Theory. Going back to chapter 2 we remember that this theory presupposes the 
existence of two systems of thought that influence behaviour. On one side System 1 is 
automatic and impulsive, responsible for many of our behavioural shortcomings. On the 
other hand, System 2 is deliberate and reflective, the one which allows us to reason.  
Whereas in some authors these two systems are seen as parts of one whole interactive 
unit, the libertarian paternalists seem to take a literal interpretation to this dichotomy of 
thought processing in order to justify their right to intervene. 
 
“They take this idea very seriously and literally, and use the ‘two-selves’ language 
as far more than a suggestive metaphor. Indeed so ‘real’ are the two selves 
supposed to be, that libertarian paternalists even adopt and modify in their writings 
the language of externalities (…) and speak of internalities”289 
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Under this light, through a small step in reasoning, they can justify paternalistic 
interventions in accordance to Mill’s harm principle290. By introducing the concept of 
internalities, the paternalists are opening space to protect the rational System 2 from the 
hedonistic System 1. Here the problem stands that libertarian paternalists seem to 
clearly prioritize System 2’s rationality without a justification beyond the fact that it’s 
the rational-self.  
 
 “[T]he circularity of the argument is not immediately apparent because we tend 
to think that listening to reason is ‘obviously’ good. However, from the logical 
point of view, one could after all, just as validly have said: we should listen to an 
individual’s first, unreflective reactions. (…) Logically nothing distinguishes the 
two criteria to give preference to one ‘System’ over the other”291 
   
 Thus, it becomes easy to see that even though libertarian paternalists are trying 
to objectively define people’s true preferences, they themselves are falling prey to a 
subjective view of “whose” preference to choose. As they believe that System 2’s 
choices are more competent to achieve what they deem as most important – welfare – 
they are deliberately picking the preferences they think are best, in favour of the System 
2 self and to the detriment of the System 1 self292.  
 It is because libertarian paternalists see the System 1 self as lacking, that they 
reject the idea that our emotional and intuitive side can too, make instrumentally good 
decisions. By infantilizing one part of the individual, who is unable to choose “true” 
preferences because of this child-like involuntary System 1, their position takes a 
traditional paternalistic stance293. 
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 But the new-paternalists go further in their assessment of this dichotomy of the 
self. For them our cognitive biases and inadequacies of System 1 are so deeply rooted in 
our neurology that to the libertarian paternalists, they are taken as an unchangeable 
biological given. Apparently, we are biologically determined as imperfect thinkers294. 
Our cognitive biases and rationality are part of our human nature and cannot be 
overcome. Sunstein goes further in stating that this expands beyond the abstract: 
 
“identifiable regions of the brain are active in different task and hence it may well 
be right to suggest that the idea of systems has physical referent (…) ‘automatic 
and controlled processes can be roughly distinguished by where they occur in the 
brain’”295 
 
 The evidence that Sunstein is referring to has to be looked at very carefully. 
Despite some evidence showing that different regions of the brain are in fact related to 
automatic processes whereas others are more active with reflective processes296, this 
does not mean that those regions and functions are necessarily stagnant. Concepts of 
adaptability and plasticity must also be considered. Moreover, there are no studies, to 
this point, that show with certainty that Stanovich and West’s two systems of thought 
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4.2 Problems Arising with Libertarian Paternalism in relation to political liberty 
and decisional autonomy 
 
 4.2.1 Nominal Freedom or Real Freedom   
 When Sunstein compares nudges to GPS systems298 he is either inferring that we 
have an a priori alternative to being nudged or that we use a GPS system because, 
rationally, what we truly desire is to reach a given destination as fast and economically 
as possible (our welfare), without ever going astray. Against the latter let’s recall the 
brief discussion in section 4.1.4; libertarian paternalists claim to know our latent 
subjective preferences by considering an objective measure of welfare. They further 
claim that individuals desire (truly) to be nudged in order to overcome what 
policymakers see as errors that hinder our good decision-making299. However, as has 
been argued, it is impossible for an outsider to know what people truly want, or to 
assume an action as irrational based on the quality of its outcome.  
 Considering the first inference and accepting it as one of the main characteristics 
of nudges - their easy-reversibility - we cannot compare the voluntary choice to use an 
external aid300 (the GPS) as the same as accepting an already implemented intervention 
without our stipulated authorization. 
 This means that there is liberty to use a GPS and the capacity to voluntarily 
employ its use, but by comparison there’s no choice to being “nudged”, especially in the 
case of default rules, there is rather the possibility to actively choose to not be ‘nudged’. 
The difference might seem small, but it is highly pertinent. The fact that libertarian 
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paternalists assign no particular weight to liberty beyond the narrow focus of choice 
preservation301  is illustrative.  
 As Sunstein (2014a) counter argues some of Mill’s ideas trying to justify his 
position, it becomes important to understand that for Mill freedom is not only associated 
with alternative of choice but also with dignity, autonomy, individuality and self-
development302. 
 
 “[T]o conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him 
any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The 
human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, 
and even moral preference are exercised only in making a choice. He who does 
anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. (...) The mental and moral, like 
the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. (…). He who lets the 
world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any 
other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for 
himself, employs all his faculties. (…) It is possible that he might be guided in 
some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what 
will be his comparative worth as a human being?”303 
  
 If we consider that not actively joining a plan is a non-voluntary action and that 
all actions should be presumed voluntary, except in the face of coercion, then it stands 
to reason that Libertarian Paternalism is traditionally paternalistic.  And, even though 
their proposals tend to fall on soft forms of paternalism, i.e. non-forbidding and freedom 
preserving, it is possible to analyse how some of the proposed measures pose real 
threats to liberty. Perhaps as much as harder, more restrictive, policies entail.  
 The case of organ donation in Europe is a case in point. There is an incredible 
gap between countries that have a policy of presumed consent – citizens are automatic 
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donors – and those countries who have a policy of active choosing – people need to 
voluntarily register as a donor. Countries such as Austria, Sweden, France, Portugal, 
Poland and Hungary have a consent rate of donation from a minimum of 85.9% 
(Sweden) to a maximum of 99.98% (Austria). Other nations such as Germany, 
Denmark, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom display organ donation rates 
ranging from 4.25% to 27.5%304.   
 Trying to understand this numerical difference by contrasting cultural values and 
societal norms can only be counterproductive. Realizing that it is probably as easy to 
sign up for organ donation in Germany as it is to opt out in Austria one must ask “what 
is the value of the reversibility of choice set up by libertarian paternalists if freedom of 
choice is not exercised”305, that is, if the nudges of the libertarian paternalists are so 
effective. A citizen in Austria, while nominally free to choose to reverse the default, 
does not do so.  
 Libertarian paternalists face a conundrum; the more effective their policies are, 
the more “real” freedom of choice seems to become non-existent. This means that when 
the effectiveness of the nudge reaches almost 100% (as in the case of organ donation in 
Austria, and the SMT scheme with automatic enrolment), the easy-reversibility 
characteristic becomes merely abstract. Thus, “real” liberty ceases to be preserved. A 
default that is highly effective does not let us know how many Austrians do actually 
want to be organ donors and how many would actively choose it. Going back to Berlin 
we can remember that: 
 
 “['Negative liberty'] might, prima facie, seem to depend simply on the power to 
choose between at any rate two alternatives. Nevertheless, not all choices are 
equally free, or free at all. The mere existence of alternatives is not, therefore, 
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enough to make my action free (although it may be voluntary) in the normal sense 
of the word.”306 
 
 When faced with the effectiveness of some of the libertarian paternalistic 
policies, and if many other policies proposed are as effective as they claim and want 
them to be, then this soft paternalism is, in some cases, almost as restrictive as 
traditional harder forms of paternalism, if not, equally restrictive. It is here that 
libertarian paternalism becomes blatantly a contradiction on itself. 
 
 4.2.2 The Importance of Experience and Learning 
 By proposing measures that limit and constrict decisions, libertarian paternalists 
dismiss the importance of experience in the process of reaching the full potential of the 
individual.  From a liberal point of view, unencumbered actions are the best source for 
self-development. Libertarian Paternalism here ignores the value of the freedom to 
err307.   People learn as much from mistakes as they do from successes and consequently 
grow as an individual from either. Government interference automatically limits and 
restricts this process of self-development, not only, because it assumes to know better, 
but also because it obstructs our decisional autonomy. 
 
“In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the 
average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be 
done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental 
education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their 
judgement, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they 
are thus left to deal.”308 
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 Decisional autonomy exists when we are conscious of our own decisions, and 
when we are capable of acting on our own, by our own reflection. When a government 
sets out rules under principles of behavioural sciences, that more often than not we are 
unaware of, it becomes impossible to claim those decisions as our own, or to revel in 
the fruits of the experience of choosing and the responsibility that comes with the 
choice.  
 John Stuart Mill admits that even if, as outsiders, we were confident that we 
knew which way of life would be best for the choosers, their well-being would still be 
better promoted through themselves experiencing mistakes and learning from them.309  
He is not claiming that we can’t make judgements on others choices and well-being, but 
rather that we shouldn’t allow for those judgements to justify restricting freedom of 
choice310. Mill feels that in doing so would restrain their ability to learn from the 
experiments that lead to the fulfilment of the individual’s self-realisation.311  
 In the case of Libertarian Paternalism this interference becomes even more 
problematic because it specifically focusses on targeting our automatic System 1, 
designing policies that circumvent our reflective selves. Thus, further restricting our 
capacity to critically analyse our decisions and consequently improve our “mental 
education”.  
 Furthermore, let us analyse the libertarian paternalists’ upheld view of our 
biological determinism, as it becomes relevant to the discussion. In his book Why 
Nudge, Sunstein presents some evidence to show how the brain seems to be functionally 
divided even though this evidence is not as straightforward and simple as he implies. In 
Rebonato we are introduced to concepts of plasticity, where the brain recovers lost 
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functions by rewiring (creating new pathways) instead of reactivating damaged areas; 
and the related concept of adaptability where the mental processes can adapt to the 
environmental demands of a lifetime. Under these concepts the human brain cannot be 
considered as made of a pre-determined and stagnant binary system. Rather Mill’s 
speculation becomes empirically much more pertinent: “the mental and moral, like the 
muscular powers, are improved only by being used”312 
 Assuming that it is possible to change the settings of our System 1 and improve 
one’s ability to reason, it becomes incredibly relevant to devote more time to the task. In 
doing so, nudges would cease to be necessary, people would be able to achieve their 
own true preferences and most importantly individuals would receive greater respect 
and dignity for the integrity and responsibility of their decisional autonomy. Alas, 
libertarian paternalists “tell us that experience, expertise, and incentives cannot be 
counted on to protect decision-makers from the influence of the choice-frame”313  
 To Sunstein and Thaler the deterministic view of the two systems of thought 
actually moves them further away from the libertarian claim to their paternalism. 
Emerging evidence shows that it is possible to be less susceptible to decision 
manipulation through the use of debiasing techniques314, but the idea of overcoming 
cognitive bias is absent from the libertarian paternalistic thesis.   
 Different tests have shown successful outcomes for overcoming cognitive biases 
and for expanding the reasoning of System 2. By dismissing the role of experience and 
learning, libertarian paternalists are further hindering our liberties and, therefore, our 
potential for self-development. An extended quote by Rebonato is appropriate to 
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conclude how the dismissal of experience and of learning by oneself has serious 
implications for liberty: 
  
 “It is therefore reasonable to conclude that individuals can learn to become 
System-II thinkers, or at least to apply System-II thinking to more areas of their 
decision-making than libertarian paternalists seem to assume. (…) studies also 
suggest that not encouraging individual to make conscious, deliberate, well-
reasoned choices can reinforce the System I (…) [T]he more decisions are reached 
by, say, exploiting a lack of understanding of the effect of inflation (…), or by 
relying on the intent acceptance of a default option, the less the neural pathways 
associated with our reflective mode of thinking are activated – and the more our 
brains will become ill-equipped to reason rationally and critically about the next 
choice. (…) It is in this sense that the cognitive deficiencies of individuals can truly 
become, by their systematic exploitation, a self-fulfilling prophecy”315 
 
 The fact is that Libertarian Paternalists seem to dismiss completely an 
educational side to their libertarian view, to the extent that there is no interest in helping 
people overcome problems in reasoning in order to become more capable and free to 
choose in the future, “(…) to create conditions in which those who lack them will be 
provided with opportunities to exercise those rights (freedom to choose) which they 
legally possess, but cannot, without such opportunities, put to use (...)”316. As such it 
seems obvious that the preference Sunstein and Thaler show in using our unreflective 
selves to make their policies more effective, makes their position less liberal than they 
claim. 
  
 4.2.3 Transparency and Salience 
 In order to employ democratic safeguards over abusive and restrictive 
governments, policies should be transparent and easily monitored by citizens. Hard 
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paternalistic measures tend to be self-evident, as they take the form of taxes, bans, 
penalties, etc. As such, these types of policies are constantly subjected to the scrutiny of 
individuals.  By being less transparent citizens might find more difficult to monitor such 
policies, which in turn can create two problems. First, less accountability from 
government by hiding behind psychological mechanisms and consequently less control 
over government by civil society. Secondly, people might succumb to nudges more 
easily if they are unaware of them. 
 Nudge interventions, in the form of soft paternalism, are employed in ways that 
exploit our impulsive and automatic thought-processes. These measures are not often 
advertised by governments before or after implementation, and when they are, the 
framing of the disclosure is left to the planner’s endeavours. As such, these 
interventions tend to fly under the radar altogether317. 
 Sunstein for his part states that the problem with soft paternalism is not the lack 
of transparency but rather of salience. When applying soft measures such as nudges, 
they are visible, public and observable, the difference lies in that they do not attract 
attention and so do not suffer public discussion.318 However, he admits that for the most 
part nudges don’t promote scrutiny, they are not done in secret, but operate by 
influencing or appealing to System 1, and he invokes justifiability as a defence to the 
accusation of lack of transparency.  
 The libertarian paternalist argument is weak, at best. They allude, to the 
publicity principle that “bans governments from selecting a policy that it would not be 
able or willing to defend publicly to its own citizens”319 Nonetheless, it stands to reason, 
that the prospect of a future need of justification for when a policy comes to light, i.e. 
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becomes transparent, hardly accounts for the policy’s actual transparency320. This 
principle, as presented in Sunstein and Thaler, does not imply that a given policy is 
visible, but rather that it can become visible. They consider the matter of future 
transparency as a defence and use the image of a benevolent ruler as its justification. 
 Nudge interventions exploit cognitive blunders that people are unaware in order 
to guide towards more sensible decision-making. Thus, it may happen that a nudge will 
only work with a certain degree of covertness, appealing to people’s unconscious and 
possibly becoming unavoidable, restricting the freedom to ignore it.321 The lack of its 
transparency now becomes more challenging to the libertarian position to the extent 
that, not only, is the public scrutiny of government hindered but also, because of its 
covert characteristics individuals are more susceptible to the effectiveness of the 
nudge.322 
 As civil society’s capabilities of recognising and discerning such policies 
becomes somewhat hindered by its lack of transparency and salience, the risk of the 
increasing state control and manipulation becomes a conceivable reality as limits 
imposed on government by civil society decrease.  
  
4.2.4 The Slippery Slope of Libertarian Paternalism 
 So far, we have seen how behavioural sciences have identified different 
cognitive biases. Libertarian Paternalism designs policies that targets these biases in 
order to make them more effective. As such, it’s only to be expected that they should 
also use their knowledge of behavioural insights to promote their thesis323. The concept 
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of extreme-aversion claims that people tend to stay clear of the extreme choices – when 
framed between opposites people tend to choose the middle ground. Libertarian 
Paternalists have presented their movement as “the Third-way”, a moderate middle 
ground between libertarianism and hard paternalism. Nevertheless, as Whitman points 
out, the middle ground position tends to shift directions over time. Once a regulation is 
in place it can become the status quo, the accepted new norm, and as this middle ground 
changes it can demand other forms of interventions, perhaps more restrictive in nature. 
 Tobacco regulation is one of the most illustrative cases324. Banning smoking on 
airplanes, on train compartments and in school classes was once the middle ground 
position, nowadays some cities are considering banning the act in some outdoor 
areas325. All these changes in regulations tend to come about small but increasingly 
paternalistic policies that over time shift, an initial compromise becomes the accepted 
norm. 
 Phenomenon, such as framing or the small-change tolerance - “a willingness to 
tolerate changes perceived as relatively small movements from the status quo”326 - can 
be used, to one’s own advantage, to gradually expand from soft paternalistic measures 
to hard ones. Of course, recalling the discussion in the previous section, we can 
understand that from a democratic standpoint harder forms of paternalism can be more 
attractive to individuals as they are easier to track, more visible to scrutinize and 
consequently more attractive to a liberal position as it can lead to a more effective 
monitorization of government. 
 By comparison, from a public official’s standpoint we can understand an 
attraction to soft paternalism as hard paternalism demands scrutiny and deliberation, 
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public officials when devising a paternalistic policy of this kind risk public controversy 
and alienating the electorate327. Thus, soft measures that are not as salient, and 
therefore, don’t risk losing voters support might appeal to the policymaker. The more 
effective the measure turns out to be (as in the cases of defaults) the more likely it will 
be for the public official to try and expand the scope of soft paternalism.  
 With that expansion lies a much more worrying slippery slope critique: not the 
possibility of shifting from a soft-to-hard paternalism, but rather the possibility of 
becoming, not only, less overt, but more manipulative and also gradually more 
restrictive. When considering the use of more intrusive subliminal interventions, 
Sunstein and Thaler’s position is very tentative, they do not say they agree, but rather 
that they “tend to think” that it is objectionable due to lack of monitorability328. As 
libertarian paternalists do not present any coherent acceptability line to their 
programme, the slippery slope is open to less visible and more intrusive interventions. 
 
 “The less overt these modes of influencing are, the less an individual is in a 
position of reversing the ‘default option’; the greater the risks in wrongly guessing 
what the individual really wants (...); the smaller, in general, the degree of 
monitorability of the whole process. In short, the slippery slope I am worried about 
does not lead from the reversal of default options to stiff fine and prison sentences, 
but to subliminal advertising.”329 
 
 As the constant risk of being on a slippery slope advances, the more real Mill 
and Berlin’s fear becomes: the gradually increasing limitless state. Furthermore, this 
fear is deepened due to the behavioural aspect of these new-paternalisms, as it invites 
governments to focus on our cognitive mistakes and our subconscious cues for their 
own advantage. As policies of this kind risk becoming less and less visible to public 
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scrutiny and more effective in attaining governments’ objectives; the more likely it 
becomes that the “nominal freedom” of these policies ceases to be relevant as most 
humans will not act in favour of it, which in turn might end up atrophying330 our critical 
thinking. 
 As a side note, we should admire libertarian paternalists response to the slippery 
slope critique. Their stance is to dismiss the abstract discussion331 on grounds of their 
policies’ results, and because they implicitly trust a benevolent government that is 
limited by a publicity principle that only intends to design wise, “worthwhile” policies. 
 
“If our policies are unwise, then it would be constructive to criticize them directly 
rather than to rely on the fear of a hypothetical slippery slope. And if our proposals 
are worthwhile, then let’s make progress on those, and do whatever it takes to pour 
sand on the slope (assuming that we really are worried about how slippery it is)”332 
 
4.3 Libertarian Paternalism. Is it libertarian? Is it Paternalistic? Or is it, simply 
put, Welfarist? 
  
 We have seen how disperse libertarian paternalistic interventions can be, their 
policies range from tackling savings, food-habits to organ donation; they shift from 
individuals health to climate change and employ different means to achieve their 
policies, some, admittedly, more intrusive to people’s decisional autonomy than others. 
 In some ways they are paternalistic because some of their measures clearly 
tackle their concept of internalities, understood as harms to oneself. However, this can 
be more ambiguous than at first sight, as Libertarian Paternalism focusses immensely on 
their intended outcomes, it seems to shift from a means to ends type of paternalism 
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more often than not. As paternalism is defined by a matter of intention, where there is a 
purpose to guide people towards decisions that increase their well-being by ameliorating 
internalities. On the other hand, one can interpret these paternalistic policies as deriving 
from a social welfare perspective, not centred on the individual and to the benefit of 
government. 
Tackling smoke addiction or unhealthy food habits benefits the government in 
reducing investments on obesity related diseases or lung cancer treatments333. In turn 
this can allow for the redistribution of the National Health Service (NHS) means to 
either focus on other NHS treatments, on other government departments, or even 
towards tax reductions334. Going back to chapter 3, this was evident to the authors of the 
Mindspace Report who implied, more than once, that the proposed measures were 
beneficial, not from a paternalistic position, but in order to improve welfare on the 
whole, in this case justifying the intervention in order to increase public health and save 
public resources by reducing the burden on the NHS335. 
 In the end these lines become blurry as, from an outside view, no citizen can 
claim to know the real intentions of public officials. The libertarian paternalists 
assumption of a state governed by benevolent planners becomes dangerous, as the 
intentions are never clear and as political leaders have a number of goals that go beyond 
that of improving individuals’ well-being336. When faced with these policies the 
intention can become ambiguous. Where one might see a paternalistic measure that 
benefits an individual’s well-being another might see a measure that serves 
governments’ self-interest, hidden behind justifications of soft paternalism, which is 
less salient and transparent to civil society. 
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  On another, more straightforward hand, some of these policy proposals clearly 
focus outside the scope of negative internalities, but rather on a more generalized idea 
of society’s welfare. The most evident case being that of organ donation, as the donor, 
being declared dead, will never benefit from the increased availability of organs that 
libertarian paternalists are trying to reach. Even, the caricature nudge of the Schipol 
housefly mentioned in chapter 3 and often quoted by Sunstein and Thaler, is welfarist in 
kind, as it does not benefit the individual directly, but rather other users - the facility’s 
management, the cleaning department, etc. But many other of the proposed initiatives 
that went unmentioned focus on tackling climate change. Given it is mostly future 
citizens and societies that will benefit from these “green” interventions which impose 
costs on present consumption these measures cannot be considered paternalistic337. 
 These specific cases are clear-cut examples of a non-paternalistic position as 
they don’t try to target self-behaviour, but rather the best outcome for society, even at 
the expense of some, preferably few, individual’s preferences. If these policies’ aim at 
benefiting society at large, the libertarian paternalists must have a pre-existing idea of 
what is good for society and how to aggregate the welfare of all citizens. Ultimately, in 
assuming to objectively know individuals’ real preferences, in emphasizing the 
benevolence of the government rulers, in prioritizing welfare above any other value, it 
becomes plausible to assume Libertarian Paternalism as somewhat welfarist in nature, 
especially when we realize that Libertarian Paternalism defines welfare as its objective 
norm and proposes to influence and guide individuals’ behaviour in regards to that 
precise norm338, not only to improve individual’s well-being, as they see it, but also to 
increase society’s welfare. 
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 For the past five decades, developments in the different behavioural fields have 
challenged established models of rational theory. By demonstrating how people decide 
in certain situations, these sciences have contributed to the belief that people, often, 
make systematic mistakes, and as such, don’t always act of their own self-interest.   
 Theories of bounded rationality, that claim our rational actions to be limited by 
either inner constraints or external constraints, were put forth; the role of cognitive 
biases and heuristics in our behaviour has been thoroughly studied by psychology, 
culminating in extensive literature that detail hundreds of these automatic responses 
which, allegedly, tend to hinder our rational actions; Dual Process Theory that 
postulates an automatic and impulsive system of thought and another of reflective and 
deliberate action has been hypothesized, scientifically explaining the long held belief 
that we have at least two “personalities” that directly influence our choices. 
 All these insights and many other inputs from different fields of psychology 
have opened a greater space for paternalism, appealing to fields of law, economics and 
policymaking339. Insofar as paternalism means for citizens to not act fully voluntarily, 
these cognitive biases and limits to our rationality justify novel forms of paternalism as 
they consider our rational actions to be hindered by our infantilized impulsive selves. 
The libertarian paternalistic intention is evident; “bad choices” (as judged by public 
officials) demand external interference so people can be guided towards what they 
themselves consider “right choices” (from the external objective point of view of the 
public official).  
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 Because of its wide audience, due in part to the success of Sunstein and Thaler’s 
book of 2008 - Nudge, Libertarian Paternalism has become the most well-known thesis 
of these emerging “new” forms of paternalism.340 They have presented themselves as 
the real Third Way, the middle ground between the anti-paternalist and the 
paternalist341. 
 We have seen that libertarian paternalists claim their position to be libertarian 
because, to their eyes, their measures do not encroach on people’s liberties. At the same 
time, they describe themselves as paternalistic because their main intention is to guide 
people towards their own well-being342. In chapter 2, I have exposed how libertarian 
paternalists justify themselves under the belief that anti-paternalists share one false 
assumption and two misconceptions343. They highlight the anti-paternalists’ assumption, 
that individuals are the best arbiters of their own lives and, as such, always act 
according to their own self-interest and claim it to be proven false by all the 
developments in the different behavioural fields. However, here Sunstein and Thaler are 
refusing to accept that liberal theorists don’t consider people to be infallible, for liberals 
like Mill and Berlin to make mistakes is, on itself, beneficial.  
 By assuming as justification for their paternalistic stance that individuals 
obviously don’t act in their best interest and that an external expert can be better 
equipped to choose for them, they go against the anti-paternalistic objections of Mill 
and Berlin. However, the fact that men do not always act without harming themselves, 
do not always choose the most preferable choices and can be prone to making mistakes 
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is acknowledged by both these authors. Our impulsive selves are intrinsic to human 
nature, not separated from our rational-selves. 
 
“It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their 
consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and 
a weak conscience. The natural connection is the other way. (...) Strong impulses 
are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good 
may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive 
one.”344 
 
 Yet, despite this human nature, Berlin and especially Mill believed that even 
though it is possible to make external judgements over others’ decisions, there lies no 
necessity to interfere with individuals’ decisions in accordance to those judgements, 
people have the right to err.  
As we have seen in chapter 1, so long as people don’t act outside of what agreed 
laws dictate, infringing on other people’s rights, there is no need for outside intervention 
in a person’s individual life. This will only hinder individuals’ freedom to act, to learn, 
to develop and to take away the responsibility for their choices. 
Libertarian Paternalism has also created two alleged misconceptions for the anti-
paternalists: that there exists a viable way to paternalism and that paternalism always 
involves coercion. Regarding the former, Sunstein and Thaler argue that there is always 
some form of external influence on behaviour, as behaviour tends to be context-
dependent.  
 For the new paternalists behavioural insights have shown that most of our 
preferences are context-dependent and as such they argue that preferences do “not 
                                                 




formally exist”345. They claim that if every detail matters, and because we don’t live 
without context, a form of influence is always present and as such it ought to be 
benevolent, it ought to promote individual welfare. Furthermore, in the literature 
libertarian paternalists do not provide a concrete and coherent reason to why a less 
benevolent alternative (such as prioritizing profit) is less viable when having the power 
of choice-architecture (the design of contexts)346. But it is because of this benevolent 
streak that welfare - “whatever choosers would think make their lives go well”347 - 
becomes the normative value to their policymaking and the only viable option. 
From here the authors conclude that a proper alternative to some kind of 
paternalism – “at least in the form of an intervention that affects what people choose”348 
- does not exist. However, we have seen that this argument is far-fetched as paternalism 
cannot be defined as any intervention, but rather a purposeful one with the intention to 
change behaviour in a supposedly better direction.  
 With this thought in mind, libertarian paternalists accept, on one side, 
preferences to be subjective – "as judged by themselves" – and on the other side, 
dismiss that our automatic revealed preferences can actually be our “true” preferences.  
Ultimately, they put themselves in the difficult position of objectively stipulating what 
people “truly” desire,349 dismissing the subjectivity and diversity of individuals’ 
preferences, even our rational ones, and consequently dismissing Mill’s ardent defence 
for experiencing and individuality.  
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“If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common-sense and experience, his 
own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, 
but because it is his own mode.”350 
 
 Regarding the second misconception – that paternalism always involves 
coercion - it can be concluded that indeed soft forms of paternalism might not involve 
extensive coercive measures. However, in this case, it seems more pertinent to ask 
whether if by not being coercive, paternalism can still have no implications for liberty 
and thus be called truly libertarian? 
 It has not been my intention with this to continue the never-ending debate 
between the liberal and the paternalistic positions. I haven't felt obliged to discuss the 
importance of welfare in society or to better define Libertarian Paternalism (as it can be 
argued on some grounds that it is neither libertarian nor paternalistic). My purpose was 
rather, to challenge the claims that Libertarian Paternalism has (1) no implications for 
liberty and decisional autonomy because their policies preserve freedom of choice; (2) 
that anti-paternalistic objections are unwarranted because people have now been proven 
to not always act in their best interest and because paternalism doesn’t need to be 
coercive; and (3) because choices are context-dependent, soft paternalism is the only 
viable option available351. 
 Despite these paternalistic assumptions not being entirely new, they use 
evidence of relatively new fields of research to support their thesis. Because of this, the 
idea to “take advantage” of behavioural empirical evidence in order to attain 
government's’ goals, (which by libertarian paternalists’ standards should be welfare), 
deserves the same scrutiny and reservations as seen in Mill and Berlin.  
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Libertarian paternalists are blatantly inviting governments to use behavioural 
insights to their advantage in order to design more effective policies, thus giving more 
power of manipulation to the state352. As we have seen, these types of policies tend to 
lack transparency, try to use cognitive biases and predictable behaviour to their own 
gains, and mostly target our automatic cues. Thus, the tension that should exist between 
governments and their civil societies becomes more relaxed. 
Ultimately, it seems that Libertarian Paternalism is calling for greater state 
influence over people’s individual lives without setting proper limits in place against the 
abuse of government practices. As measures of this type are less transparent, the risk of 
an all-encompassing state that disrespects individualism and that dismisses the benefits 
of personal autonomous experiences353, becomes more ever-present. 
 Libertarian paternalists fail here to understand the benefits of decisional 
autonomy for the good of society, and because they use a very narrow concept of 
negative liberty – the mere preservation of choice – they seem unable to grasp that the 
more effective their policies become, the less “real” freedom to voluntarily choose what 
people truly prefer will exist354. But more importantly, libertarian paternalists are 
unaware that governments might use these types of policies in order to gain more power 
by exploiting the lack of transparency and by developing more manipulative and 
intrusive policies355. As they, themselves, only reluctantly refuse the idea of using 
subliminal means to achieve their goals because those types of measures are more 
invisible and impossible to monitor, it is not inconceivable to consider that a 
government might feel the attractiveness of such policies. 
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 Despite all its risks and possible implications, it must be concluded that so far 
“nudging” is hardly a dystopian tool of state control, it is ruled on grounds of preserving 
choice of action, it tends to value freedom of choice and many of the initiatives 
proposed are relatively less intrusive than harder measures. It is also easy to understand 
why their proposed measures are attractive, as it becomes difficult to oppose initiatives 
that intend to raise organ donations or to tackle obesity and climate change.  
We can accept that libertarian paternalists are indeed liberal in kind, or at the 
very least more liberal than hard-core paternalists. They value freedom of choice and 
their measures tend to be guided by soft forms of paternalism, but this does not mean on 
itself that their proposal and underlying assumptions have no implications for political 
and individual liberty. We have seen in chapter 3 how even some of the less intrusive 
measures, such as merely providing information for students to enrol at university, 
diminishes the importance of decisional autonomy and gives power to the state to use 
psychological mechanisms to comply with certain government objectives. Thus, when 
considering government goals and party intentions it must be understood that 
Libertarian Paternalism in theory does not necessarily account for certain variables it its 
practical application.  
But the fact that they argue against the risk of a slippery slope on grounds of 
benevolent rulers and because of the assumption of justifiability as their limit to 
government action – where government is bounded only according to their ability to 
justify their practices to citizens – makes one believe that libertarian paternalists have a 
deep-rooted trust in government officials to do only that which is right towards their 
citizens. At the same time, libertarian paternalists are those presenting an interpretation 
of empirical evidence that allows governments to look at citizens as not fully competent 




justifiably, disrespect citizens reflective autonomy, contributing to potential further 
abuses of trust and the dismissal of public discussion.356  
  Even if a group of persons supports a given goal for themselves, even if the 
government is able to justify their measures to citizens, people might still not support 
covert initiatives intended to guide them to that given goal. From a liberal point of view, 
the end in itself is important but how it is reached is too.357 As Sunstein noted, 
impersonal default rules are only acceptable by the chooser when there is trust in the 
planner358. Nudge policies are also better supported when targeting more technical 
decisions, where people lack the expertise to make a properly informed choice (as in the 
case of a savings rate for retirement). This support seems to go in the opposite direction 
when nudges are targeting different types of decisions (such as organ donation) 359 or 
individual choices (such as the choice to eat fattening food)360.   
From a policymaking point of view, it would be wrong to dismiss all the 
developments in the behavioural fields because of the fear of how this knowledge can 
be used to manipulate and encroach on people’s freedoms. It rather seems essential to 
understand the evidence that has come to light in order to design effective and beneficial 
policies. However, it is my understanding that this should not be done by ways of using 
these findings for governments’ own advantage as libertarian paternalists propose, by 
exploiting people’s automatic cues without their knowledge and by interfering in areas 
that perhaps should not fall under a governmental scope.  
 It is with this in mind, that in closing, I wonder if liberty is as important to 
Sunstein and Thaler as they say it is. From a different perspective it is easy to see 
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measures that also use behavioural insights to design policies that protect individuals 
from certain behaviours, and that can help them overcome some of their internalities 
and most importantly that don’t seem to carry such strong implications for political 
liberty and decisional autonomy. 
 For example, when faced with all the behavioural findings, paternalists that 
value freedom could design an interim educational proposal. This would be intended to 
improve citizen’s behavioural literacy in order to overcome, or at the very least, become 
aware of their cognitive biases/heuristics and how these allow for external manipulation 
by central planners361. In making their position temporary, they would still be 
descriptively paternalistic as their purpose would still be to enhance quality of choice 
towards welfare, yet they would not impose policies on people but rather leave them 
free to act as they desired, whether in favour of System 1 or of System 2, once their 
educational period would end.   
  In using debiasing techniques362, libertarian paternalists could empower people 
to learn and expand their critical abilities, overcome decisional blunders, becomie more 
autonomous by their own standards, as our System 2 selves would expand363, and 
therefore make preferable choices. The idea of educating citizens to expand their 
rationality, to overcome their cognitive biases, to call attention to possible manipulation 
from outside parties, instead of using unconscious and subconscious cues to guide 
people towards their future well-being, can go much more hand in hand with a 
libertarian position. Even Mill, who looked at centralized education as a threat to 
individualism, acknowledged that education should be used to cultivate individuals’ 
mental capabilities and virtues, at least during citizens’ formative years.  
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 Libertarian paternalists propose instead to use known behavioural fallibilities to 
comply with their objective idea of what individuals “think is good for themselves”. 
Having this in mind it bears quoting Mill’s last thoughts in On Liberty: 
 
 “The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; 
and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, 
to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice 
gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they 
may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find 
that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.”364 
 
 But, considering behavioural insights, there might lie another possible way to 
become legitimately paternalistic, one that does not preclude the use of citizen’s biases 
for governments own gain. Instead paternalists could try to protect people by focusing 
on those who might, and often do, exploit people’s errors in order to promote their own 
self-interest. Different industries are more than aware of the empirical evidence shown 
in chapter 2 and the different tendencies of human behaviour. Many of these industries 
have chosen to employ different means of behavioural manipulation in the direction of 
their own interests to garner larger profits, and less in the directions of individuals’ own 
good. As these industries are often not dictated by moral limits or benevolent 
justifications, this exploitation of our cognitive biases/heuristics can itself harm 
individuals and can also be considered an abuse of private power over consumers.  
Thus, it seems plausible to propose that governments are justified to regulate the 
abuse and excesses of this type of private manipulation. As even Isaiah Berlin claimed 
that “freedom for the wolves has often meant death to the sheep” and that a position of 
absolute non-interference in markets “armed the strong, the brutal and the unscrupulous 
                                                 




against the humane and the weak” failing to “provide the minimum condition in which 
any degree of significant ‘negative’ liberty can be exercised by individuals (...)365.  
 In this regard, in 2011, for example, France made an addendum to their bioethics 
code stating that: “brain imaging methods can be used only for medical or scientific 
research purposes or in the context of court expertise”366. Also relating to this matter, 
Oliver (2013a; 2015; 2017) proposes, in contrast to nudges, the concept of “budge 
policy”: a behavioural economic-informed regulation designed to budge the private 
sector away from socially harmful acts. 
 
“An education in behavioural economic concepts can sometimes give a legitimate 
justification – a theoretical foundation – for public officials to regain the 
confidence to lead, by offering potential insights into where and how their citizens’ 
cognitive limitations are being exploited excessively, and by also imbibing 
politicians with a sense of awareness of the bounds on their own rationality. 
Behavioural economic- informed regulation – or budge policy – calls for stronger 
and clearer input from behavioural economics (...) and recognises that policy 
makers should often aspire to budge profit-oriented industry (...) rather than nudge 
citizens if they are to serve more effectively the social good.” 367  
 
 In contrast to these proposals, Libertarian Paternalism is inviting 
governments to exploit our automatic biases in order to design more effective 
policies. These paternalists present an idea of citizens as incompetent thinkers, with 
compromised rationality and as a result, governments might, under this assumption, 
start to treat citizens differently to one that respects people’s reflective autonomy368, 
succumbing to the slippery slope of paternalism.  
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 By proposing measures that are not very transparent; by dismissing the 
benefits of learning through experience; by applying policies that makes choices for 
citizens; and, most importantly, by implicitly trusting government officials to act on 
behalf of citizens’ own well-being, Libertarian Paternalism’s implications for liberty 
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